The Jacksonian Imperative Revisited

(Andrew Jackson’s 1829 inauguration: The birth of a populist doctrine)

The geopolitical landscape of 2026 is marked by a clear paradox. The United States continues to hold unmatched military capabilities and significant economic leverage, yet it shows less interest in managing the daily mechanics of the international order than at almost any point since the end of World War II. This shift is often described as the triumph of Jacksonian foreign policy over the Wilsonian liberalism that shaped the post–Cold War era. While that framing captures part of the change, it risks overstating ideological clarity where strategic adjustment offers a more accurate explanation.

The Jacksonian tradition, most clearly outlined by Walter Russell Mead, places national sovereignty, domestic economic stability, and physical security at the center of foreign policy. Unlike Wilsonian approaches, which emphasize institutions, norm-building, and democracy promotion, Jacksonian thinking remains skeptical of prolonged foreign engagement, especially when costs are high and benefits appear distant or indirect. Even so, the current U.S. posture does not amount to a full rejection of liberal internationalism. Instead, it reflects an effort to maintain influence while reducing the burdens associated with constant global enforcement.

For much of the late twentieth century, the United States acted as a liberal hegemon, sustaining alliances, stabilizing key regions, and supporting multilateral institutions that promoted open markets and political norms. This role required persistent intervention, from peacekeeping in the Balkans to large-scale state-building efforts in the Middle East. Over time, these commitments strained domestic political support and exposed the limits of hegemonic management, particularly after the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reshaped public attitudes toward foreign intervention.

By 2026, this reassessment has taken a more concrete form, often summarized as a “lead, but do not police” approach. Leadership, in this sense, focuses on preserving favorable balances of power, securing access to critical markets and trade routes, and preventing the rise of a hostile hegemon in strategically vital regions. Policing, the ongoing task of maintaining order, rebuilding institutions, and managing local conflicts, is increasingly left to regional actors, even where U.S. interests remain involved.

This shift is especially visible in the Middle East and surrounding maritime corridors. Unlike the period shaped by the Carter Doctrine, when Washington assumed primary responsibility for protecting global energy flows, the United States now operates from a position of relative energy independence. While it retains the naval capacity to secure key chokepoints such as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, it increasingly expects major energy importers, including the European Union, China, and India, to take a leading role in maritime security. The reasoning is largely pragmatic: where the direct economic stake is limited, the rationale for exclusive American responsibility becomes weaker.

This selectivity, however, does not imply a complete withdrawal; in certain regions, U.S. involvement remains pronounced. A clear example of this selective approach can be seen in Venezuela and Greenland. In Venezuela, the United States maintains strategic military presence and political engagement, motivated by control over energy resources, regional stability, and the containment of rival powers’ influence. While it avoids large-scale interventions or long-term nation-building, the U.S. acts when direct interests are at stake. Similarly, Greenland represents a critical point for Arctic security and access to strategic mineral resources. American interest in these regions demonstrates that, even amid a relative retreat from global “policing,” Washington continues to intervene selectively in areas of significant geopolitical or economic importance.

A similar pattern appears in U.S. involvement in Eastern Europe. Washington continues to supply advanced military equipment, intelligence support, and logistical coordination to Ukraine, reflecting its interest in preventing a major shift in the European balance of power. At the same time, expectations of direct troop deployments or long-term financial responsibility for civilian administration and reconstruction have largely faded. Postwar stabilization is increasingly framed as a European task, consistent with a broader return to offshore balancing rather than sustained territorial engagement.

In the Indo-Pacific, the adjustment is less visible in troop numbers and more evident in technology and economic policy. Rather than focusing on ideological transformation in Southeast Asia, the United States has emphasized what might be described as a strategy of technological insulation. Measures such as reshoring semiconductor production and tightening export controls on advanced computing and artificial intelligence aim to reduce strategic dependence while preserving long-term competitiveness. Security commitments to allies like Japan and the Philippines remain in place, particularly through extended deterrence, but Washington shows little appetite for involvement in every localized maritime dispute unless a clear treaty obligation is at stake.

Together, these developments contribute to a broader structural shift toward a more multipolar international system. As the United States steps back from its role as the default guarantor of last resort, responsibility for maintaining regional order becomes increasingly fragmented. This diffusion does not simply redistribute power; it alters the incentives that govern state behavior. In the absence of a clearly dominant enforcer, regional powers are more likely to hedge through arms accumulation, flexible alignments, and selective norm compliance rather than commit fully to collective security frameworks.

While this environment may encourage greater regional ownership and burden-sharing, it also introduces strategic ambiguity. Multipolar systems tend to rely less on rule enforcement and more on deterrence and signaling, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation, particularly in regions where power hierarchies remain unsettled. The result is not immediate disorder, but a more brittle form of stability, sustained by overlapping interests rather than shared institutional authority.

From a legal and institutional perspective, this transition presents additional challenges. International law and multilateral institutions have historically relied not only on formal rules, but on the sustained political commitment and material backing of dominant powers. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective and increasingly shaped by transactional logic, these frameworks face erosion not through formal withdrawal, but through uneven enforcement and strategic neglect.

The credibility of legal norms weakens when compliance appears conditional rather than principled. Over time, this dynamic risks normalizing exceptions, encouraging states to treat international obligations as instruments of convenience rather than binding constraints. The cumulative effect is a gradual hollowing-out of institutional authority, even as the formal architecture of international law remains intact.

The current American posture, then, is best understood not as isolationism or ideological victory, but as a pragmatic response to domestic constraints, strategic fatigue, and shifting global power dynamics. By retreating from the role of constant enforcer while preserving decisive influence in key regions, the United States seeks to recalibrate leadership rather than abandon it.

Whether this approach ultimately promotes stability or deepens systemic volatility will depend less on American intent than on the adaptive capacity of other states. Leadership without continuous supervision requires credible regional actors, resilient institutions, and a willingness to assume costs that the United States is no longer prepared to bear alone. In their absence, selective leadership may prove insufficient to prevent fragmentation, even as American power remains central to the system it no longer fully manages. 

Sources

MEAD, Walter Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. Routledge, 2002

FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order, 2017.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL. What the Indo‑Pacific Thinks of the New U.S. National Defense Strategy, Jan. 2026 

ZEIHAN, Peter. The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization. Harper Business, 2022. (For the perspective on U.S. energy independence and its effect on maritime policing).

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND lNTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS). 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers: Radical Changes, Moderate Changes, and Some Continuities. Jan. 2026 

AGWANDA, Billy. "Lead the World, Don’t Police It: A Hamiltonian Approach to Power and Foreign Policy." Foreign Analysis, Jan. 2026