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By: Manuela Medeiros When we are asked to picture a modern politician, that image is often corrupted with manipulation, deceit, and moral ambiguity. Yet, philosophical principles challenge this image. As Sir John Locke posits: “The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom” This principle casts a critical light on this image, especially when it functions to limit public agency or distort democratic participation.  When politicians lie, through pandemic misinformation, false war justifications, or electoral deceit—they are not merely distorting facts; they undermine the freedom the law is meant to protect while reshaping reality to serve power over people. By knowingly misleading the public, politicians restrict the citizen’s ability to make informed decisions, effectively eroding the consent that underpins democratic legitimacy.  While not all political lies merit criminal sanctions, those who cause measurable harm to democratic processes should incur non-criminal punishments, such as disqualification or public censure, in order to preserve democratic legitimacy without threatening First Amendment rights or decaying into authoritarianism. Preliminary to drawing up any concrete decisions on whether politicians should be punished for lying, the fundamental question is: what constitutes a lie in the political sphere?   Unlike casual conversation, political discourse occupies a space of persuasion, ambiguity, and strategic intent, attributes that politicians are often expected to embody. Yet even in this murky terrain, a difference stands between rhetoric and deliberate falsehood.  Parallel to being the counterpart of a lie, truth, in the political sphere, is an abstract noun involving  communication that respects the public’s right to receive information free from deliberate deception or manipulation. Political truth is often contextual—less about metaphysics and more about transparency, balancing factual accuracy with purely strategic communication.  Moreover, let a political lie be defined as “knowingly false statements made by a politician with the intent to mislead the public or manipulate outcomes”, crossing into morally and potentially legally punishable territory, especially when they stem from tangible harm or pose international risk. This definition shall further exclude unintentional misstatements or speculative claims made without malicious intent, which fall under political error or exaggeration. Having defined what constitutes a political lie, the consideration towards how different political systems react to such deceit is crucial.     Syria, once governed by President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, was infamous for denying war crimes, including the use of chemical weapons. International attempts to punish these lies, through UN reports and sanctions, have done little to change behaviour or protect civilians. This illustrates that in autocratic or war-torn contexts, where truth is monopolised and power unchecked, punitive mechanisms not only fail but risk reinforcing persecution narratives. It underscores a core argument of this essay: holding politicians accountable for lying must be tailored to the strength of institutions and the political environment, otherwise, it risks symbolism without substance or collateral harm.    Yet, a focal point into the implications of political punishment in democracy rather than the less common authoritarianism is essential, unlike authoritarian leaders, democratic politicians depend on public approval in order to be elected, where they often distort their aims to gain support. Thus, in order to punish the politicians who dared to deceive the public, we shall compare the various types of punishments available and their usage in each case scenario. Consider Nixon's resignation before impeachment due to the Watergate scandal as an example, where Nixon’s concealment of the truth reflects a broader pattern among U.S. presidents, suggesting that politicians frequently capsize under public and institutional pressure when exposed for dishonesty.    Under Kantian ethics, Nixon’s deception reduces the public to mere instruments of power, stripping them of rational agency, a direct moral failure. In parallel, Locke would deem the violation of informed consent as a breach of the very freedom the law exists to protect.     It is in today's world where information spreads rapidly, that public opinion is highly reactive to even minor news, especially when shaped by media bias. In 2014, Brazil faced widespread outrage when a corruption network resulted in multiple prominent and once trusted figures going to trial and a spark in public outrage in regard to local companies and politicians. This scandal demonstrates how systemic deceit corrodes democratic legitimacy, as evidenced by a 20-point drop in trust in public institutions between 2014–2018 (Ivanova, 2022), following revelations from Operation Car Wash (Fig. 1).                         Fig. 1: Declining voter confidence in Brazil following repeated corruption scandals.   When a politician lies, they go beyond betraying policy, they betray their followers, they betray the nation they are meant to protect.    Consequently, when a politician is dismissed for any of these reasons, a democratic decline may follow through whereas unpunished lies set a precedent that politicians are above the law, weakening checks and balances whilst highlighting how a functioning democracy requires voters to make informed decisions, a requirement that doesn't coexist with distorted truth and manipulation of public opinion and that unfairly influence elections. While the instinct to punish dishonesty in politics is strong, not all lies are equal in intent, weight, or consequence. In some cases, punishing political lies can harm democratic discourse and must be carefully weighed beforehand. As some argue all political lies must be punished to uphold integrity, but this risks authoritarian overreach; which can be used to justify extreme policies, silence dissent, or limit freedoms. A significant concern with any model that punishes political lying is the risk that authoritarian leaders might exploit it to silence dissent and suppress opposition. In regimes where checks and balances are weak, laws against ‘lying’ or ‘disinformation’ can be arbitrarily applied to target critics, journalists, activists or political opponents under the guise of maintaining the euphemistic ‘truth and order'. This weaponization of silence undermines democratic freedoms, erodes free speech and consolidates authoritarian control. Friedrich Nietzsche's insight that “truths” are often constructed by figures of vigour, underscores the efforts to enforce transparency through punishment and how this risks entrenching ruling narratives and silencing dissenting voices, thereby undermining the pursuit of genuine, objective truth in politics. They may solidify dominant ideologies and suppress dissenting perspectives, turning a pursuit of objectivity into a mechanism of control. Nietzsche's concern echoes Mill's argument that the right to express controversial, unpopular, or even false ideas is protected under the principle of free speech, a foundational value in liberal systems and the prevailing risks of punishing them. In ‘ On Liberty’ , Mill warned that suppressing even false opinions impoverishes public discourse by preventing the clash of ideas from producing truth.  A key specimen is Tony Blair's endorsement of the Iraq invasion in 2003—his support being based on intelligence claiming Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Later proved that intelligence was inexact, Blair insisted it was a blunder; not a deliberate attempt at lying. The Chilcot Inquiry considered it a serious failure of judgment rather than intentional deceit and Blair was never legally punished, though his reputation suffered as he struggled to maintain an honorable position in modern politics. In other words, this case establishes a linear space between negligence and lies; underscoring how difficult it is to assign legal punishment when intent is murky and where other factors, such as fallacious evidence, impact the case. From a Kantian lens, if Blair acted on information he knew to be uncertain while presenting it as definitive, he used the public as a means to an end, violating their rational agency. Thus, his case exemplifies the grey zone between a deliberate lie and a tragic misjudgment. Blair’s reliance on flawed evidence without verification shows reckless negligence, but it may fall short of a “political lie” as defined earlier—one made knowingly and with intent to deceive. How could society even fairly punish lies without  punishing mistakes? Political lies are not all born equal. Some stem from a culture that rewards cunning over candor, some endanger lives and some expose politicians better than any policy ever would, others are errors, exaggerations or strategic silences; a spectrum of dishonesty that must be judged accordingly. While defending  truth in authoritarian states remains a strategic nightmare, the democratic fight for honesty is far from over.   Drawing a line from Locke’s vision of informed consent, Kant’s call for moral integrity, Mill’s concern with preventing harm, we find a rudimentary commitment to truth as the basis of democratic legitimacy. Yet, Nietzsche faces this ideal by challenging whether 'truth' is ever fully objective, or merely a socially convenient construct. If truth is, as he argues, a worn metaphor shaped by power, then the very act of punishing lies risks reinforcing dominant ideologies under the guise of morality. Thus, rather than accepting Nietzsche's cynicism or Kant's moral punishment, a middle path acknowledges both: considering non-criminal sanctions like public censure or disqualification from office can hold politicians accountable without endangering free expression.  We may not silence those in power, but we can empower the people they serve.

Written By: Anna Campelo The adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 on 17 November 2025, which endorses a US-backed plan to establish an international framework for stabilizing the Gaza Strip, represents one of the most significant diplomatic developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years. Publicly, the resolution is presented as a step toward easing tensions and enabling reconstruction. Yet, it introduces a temporary governance and security system whose long-term trajectory remains uncertain. Terms such as peace, stabilization, and civilian protection suggest broad consensus, but the operational details leave critical questions unanswered. Instead of pointing to a clear political horizon, the resolution risks placing Palestinian self-determination in the hands of external actors whose authority, scope, and timelines are neither fully defined nor constrained. Who, ultimately, will decide the future of Gaza? A particularly controversial feature of Resolution 2803 is the creation of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and its accompanying Board of Peace (BoP). Unlike traditional UN peacekeeping missions, which are neutral and collectively managed, this structure concentrates decision-making power with the United States and select regional partners while maintaining the legitimacy of a UN mandate. Analysts at Chatham House have warned that this hybrid model may blur the line between multilateral oversight and strategic alignment. Regional partners often prioritize short-term security or counter-extremism goals over long-term political reconstruction. Although the resolution does not propose a permanent ISF presence, it lacks clear exit criteria or predefined timelines. Historical precedents, such as the extended UN missions in Lebanon in 2006 and Kosovo from 1999 to 2008, suggest that such missions can persist for years, producing long-lasting political and social consequences. The political design of the resolution adds further complexity. While reaffirming support for a two-state solution, it ties progress toward Palestinian self-governance to reforms within the Palestinian Authority deemed “credible and effective.” The resolution does not define what qualifies as credible or effective, nor who evaluates it. This vagueness could allow transitional periods in which Palestinian sovereignty depends on evolving and potentially arbitrary standards set by external actors. Conditionality does not preclude eventual statehood, but it introduces significant uncertainty about timing, structure, and legitimacy, particularly if disagreements among external actors or worsening security conditions delay progress. Focusing solely on Gaza also has territorial implications. The resolution does not explicitly integrate the West Bank or East Jerusalem, raising concerns that isolated stabilization could reinforce fragmentation within Palestinian territories. Legal scholars have warned that without mechanisms ensuring coherence across Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, efforts to build a unified Palestinian state may be undermined. How entrenched this segmentation becomes will depend largely on BoP operations and whether international and regional actors coordinate across all Palestinian territories. Humanitarian concerns, though emphasized in public statements, appear secondary to security priorities in operational design. The ISF mandate emphasizes disarmament, movement restrictions, and enforcement, while humanitarian aid and reconstruction remain under BoP oversight. There is a real risk that aid distribution, rebuilding projects, and economic recovery could be delayed if security disagreements dominate decision-making. Past interventions, such as the temporary UN-administered authority in southern Lebanon in 2006, illustrate how security-focused missions can unintentionally stall reconstruction and civilian support efforts. Ultimately, Resolution 2803 signals a turning point in international approaches to Gaza. It marks a shift from traditional multilateral peacekeeping toward a model where stabilization is closely tied to external supervision and conditional progress. While the resolution does not explicitly undermine Palestinian aspirations for statehood, it creates the potential for a long and uncertain transitional period with unpredictable political consequences. Sustained global attention, full transparency, accountability, and a firm commitment to Palestinian rights are essential to ensure that this framework contributes to a just and lasting solution. Are international actors prepared to meet these standards, or is Gaza on the verge of another protracted period of dependency? References • United Nations Security Council . Resolution 2803 (S/RES/2803). UN Digital Library, 2025. • International Crisis Group . Gaza’s Ceasefire Is Vital, but Only a Start (Middle East Briefing B97). • Brookings Institution . What could the Israel–Gaza deal mean for the Middle East? Brookings analysis. • Chatham House . Fragmentation of Palestinian Territories and Its Legal Implications. Middle East & North Africa Programme, 2024. • Middle East Institute (MEI) . An International Stabilization Force for Gaza. • Human Rights Watch . World Report 2025 – Israel/Palestine • Al Jazeera . UN Security Council passes US resolution mandating international stabilization force in Gaza. • The Washington Post . The US plan for Gaza won UN backing. Carrying it out could be far more difficult. • The Foreign Affairs Interview , podcast. America’s Two-State Delusion. • ABC News . UN Security Council backs US plan for Gaza. • Euronews / AP . UN Security Council approves Trump’s Gaza plan for international force • Chatham House . What is Security Council Resolution 2803, and what does it mean for the Trump Gaza plan?

What interests are at stake in a changing political game As global order fragments into overlapping centers of power and arenas of influence, the capacity for a state to mediate, balance and adapt are highly strategic. In this respect, Egypt is becoming an essential actor in the emerging multipolar order. Medium-sized powers, such as Egypt, are using this shift as an opportunity to play off greater powers against each other and are using their strategic geography, alliances and regional interests as leverage. At the crossroads of Africa, Europe and Asia, Egypt has long performed this careful balancing act. In today’s shifting landscape, it is becoming one of the most sought-after partners for regional and global powers alike. The world around it is not breaking apart but into blocs of East and West as before, rather as Dutch analysts Ruth Mampuys, Corien Prins, Haroon Sheikh and Paul ’t Hart (2025) argue, fragmenting and re-forming : power is spreading across new centers, geopolitics now shapes trade and technology, and non-Western worldviews have gained political weight. In this environment of overlapping blocs and rival ambitions, Egypt’s ability to balance interests and alignments reveals how a mid-sized state navigates a world no longer organized around a single (or two rivalling) pole. Emerging states such as Egypt are balancing their values, of which most importantly their autonomy, with their strategic interests. The latter often takes the shape of dependency. Using shared partnerships and international organizations as starting points for negotiation and cutting lucrative deals only goes so far. To have a better understanding of how Egypt is operating in this changing balance of powers, we must zoom in on its interests and goals, regionally and globally. The domestic state of affairs Egypt enters this new era burdened by domestic fragilities that inevitably shape how it sees the world, and in turn how it is perceived by the world. A decade of economic struggle, currency devaluations, rising debts, and youth unemployment has narrowed the government’s room for manoeuvring. The Egyptian population is growing faster than jobs and water supplies; subsidies are shrinking even as living costs rise. Politically, the regime’s grip on stability depends on constant inflows of foreign loans and revenues from multilateral projects.These constraints make foreign policy a means of survival. Cairo’s search for investment, aid, and diplomatic prestige is therefore inseparable from its internal balancing act between economic needs, political control, and public expectations. For Egypt, the fragmenting world order offers both risks and opportunities. The end of unipolarity means fewer guarantees but also more partners to court, more arenas to influence and more leverage to extract from its strategic geography. How Egypt positions itself amid these overlapping blocs will determine whether it remains a regional influence or becomes a peripheral actor in a crowded multipolar system. Over the past decade, Egypt has eliminated many of the threats that once defined its internal politics. The Muslim Brotherhood, for long the country’s most organized opposition force and rooted in both religious activism and social welfare networks, was outlawed after 2013. The state had succeeded in dismantling a movement that had challenged state authority since the 19th century and had considered it an existential threat. With the Brotherhood crushed and organized dissent subdued, Egypt’s main challenges are no longer ideological but structural. The economy remains under continuing strain with high unemployment and growth depending on state-driven construction megaprojects. The country’s finances rely heavily on foreign loans and investments from China and the Gulf. As the Clingendael Institute (2025) observes, this model offers only short-term relief. The construction sector provides immediate visibility and political legitimacy but in turn produces only limited employment and productivity gains. All the while Egypts dependence on external partners, in particular China remains growing. Egypt’s attempt to diversify into ICT nearshoring and digital services hints at a more sustainable path but this transition seems to be slow and uneven. With limited possibilities in the near future for domestic reform, foreign policy becomes a vehicle for economic strategy, securing capital, adopting new technologies and political validation. These internal pressures shape how Cairo views a changing global landscape. As Mampuys, Prins, Sheikh and ’t Hart argue, the world is not descending into disorder but rather it is fragmenting: power is dispersed among multiple centers as opposed to the unipolar world order we have come to know over the past three decades, geopolitics now permeates trade and technology and alternative worldviews challenge Western liberal dominance. For Egypt, this fragmentation blurs old hierarchies and creates new openings. Surrounded by rival powers competing for access to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and African markets, Cairo is looking to turn vulnerability into leverage while balancing between blocs to secure its survival and relevance in a world without a singular pole of power. Egypt’s economic structure does more than strain its domestic stability, it defines how the country positions itself in an increasingly fragmented global system. Three intertwined weaknesses (low employment, an unsustainable reliance on construction and raw materials and chronic dependence on foreign loans) shape Cairo’s path in search for partners. Low employment keeps Egypt locked in a cycle of social fragility. Each year, hundreds of thousands of young Egyptians enter a job market that cannot absorb them. This demographic pressure pushes the government to seek foreign investment that can generate quick employment gains, with the source of investment being of lesser importance. In a world where power is dispersed among multiple centers, Cairo does not have the luxury of ideological alignment that it has had in some periods of its recent history. Gulf money, Western aid, and Asian capital all become equally acceptable if they create jobs - and they certainly do. Egypt’s openness to competing investors, whether they be Saudi, Emirati, Chinese, European, fits neatly into a fragmenting order built on selective and issue-driven partnerships rather than bloc loyalty. Super powers that rely on Egyptian regional influence and access to the Suez canal in turn could possibly leverage this non-aligned stance in their foreign policy regarding Egypt. The overreliance on the construction sector deepens this dynamic. Mega-projects like the New Administrative Capital, which are financed and often built by mainly Chinese firms, have delivered short-term growth and political visibility but few lasting jobs. As the Clingendael Institute notes, this construction-driven model strengthens ties with China while crowding out innovation and private-sector diversification. This too will become an issue Egypt has to face in the near future. In a fragmented global economy, where infrastructure diplomacy replaces ideology, Egypt’s focus on construction ties it closer to Beijing’s development playbook but also signals its main vulnerability: its growth model is dependent on foreign contractors and imported finance. Finally, Egypt’s dependence on foreign loans and investments converts domestic weakness into diplomatic necessity. IMF programs, Gulf deposits at the Central Bank and Chinese credit lines give foreign partners a significant leverage. Yet this dependence also explains Egypt’s behavior in a world without a single dominant power: instead of aligning with one patron, Cairo cultivates many. By borrowing, trading, and partnering across rival spheres, it transforms necessity into strategy and manages to extract support from every pole of power. These economic patterns place Egypt at the intersection of the fragmenting world order described by Mampuys, Prins, Sheikh and ’t Hart: a system defined by multiple power centers, the return of geopolitics to trade and finance and competing (sometimes clashing) worldviews. Egypt’s fragile economy both exposes and empowers it. It is forced to act as a pragmatic broker in a landscape where dependence and influence coexist. Though the domestic dimension will be the leading cause for most states' behavior on the world stage, Egypt is surrounded by external questions that need answering. Africa: Upstream Power, Downstream Tension One of the most important areas of attention for Egypt is one that flows down from Addis Ababa. Ethiopia’s ambitions on the Nile have become the defining test of Egypt’s African diplomacy. Ethiopia frames the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as an assertion of its sovereign development rights over a river that for long was governed by colonial-era treaties (1929 and 1959). These treaties heavily favored the states downstream. Through controlling the pace of filling and operation of the river, Ethiopia seeks to secure water and energy sovereignty. In doing so it could transform itself into Africa’s largest power exporter with over 6,000 megawatts to sell electricity to Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and eventually Egypt, too. The dam is part Ethiopia’s broader vision of becoming an African power center by leveraging its geographic and institutional assets: the African Union headquarters is in Addis Ababa, it has a large and growing economy and has strategic backing from both China and Turkey. The government’s recent deal with Somaliland to access the port of Berbera is a clear step in the direction of ending its maritime dependence on Djibouti and would reinsert Ethiopia into Red Sea and Suez geopolitics. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) These same ambitions collide with Egypt’s existential vulnerabilities. Egypt depends on the Nile for 90–95% of its freshwater, making any upstream control essentially an issue of national security. Cairo’s goal is to secure a legally binding agreement on the dam’s operation and data sharing to ensure predictable flows as it is located at the very end of the river. Egypt however lacks the hydrological leverage and instead deploys diplomatic tools. It has actively mobilized the Arab League and African Union to isolate Ethiopia and used the EU and UN to press for international oversight. At the same time, Egypt’s broad regional network and participation in bodies like the Red Sea Council allow it to prevent open hostilities that could threaten Suez Canal security or migration stability. In the context of a fragmenting world order, this rivalry exemplifies how regional power politics now intertwine with global economic and maritime interests. Ethiopia’s rise represents the diffusion of power to new African centers, while Egypt’s response shows how older states adapt through coalition-building and diplomatic balancing. For external actors such as the US, China and the EU, the dispute is not only about water but also about the stability of one of the world’s busiest trade arteries and the political realignment of Africa’s emerging powers. For Egypt, Sudan is both a buffer and a bellwether. Its territory lies between the Ethiopian highlands and the Egyptian Nile delta, making it the literal midpoint of the GERD triangle and so, crucial to Egypt’s water security. Khartoum’s position on the dam can either shield or expose Egypt to upstream pressures. Sudan also directly influences the Nile’s flow, hosts key confluences and holds land that could serve as a future cooperation or confrontation zone, depending on political alignments. What Sudan needs most is stability the restoration of basic governance after the collapse of the transitional framework in 2023 and the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For Cairo, stability south of the border is not altruistic: Sudan functions as Egypt’s primary buffer against both water insecurity and regional chaos. The conflict has already produced over a million Sudanese refugees in Egypt adding social pressure to Egypt’s fragile domestic situation. Egypt currently provides diplomatic and logistical support to the SAF, calculating that a unified, army-led Sudan would best protect Egyptian interests on the Nile and maintain a familiar authoritarian order. Yet Cairo’s ambitions in Sudan extend beyond water security. It seeks to re-establish a reliable partner that can coordinate Nile management and border control, prevent foreign rivals, especially Ethiopia, Turkey, and the UAE, from dominating postwar reconstruction, secure trade and transit routes linking Upper Egypt to the Red Sea via Sudanese territory and contain migration flows before they reach Egypt’s northern borders, and eventually the EU. In a fragmenting world order, Sudan’s collapse exemplifies how fragile states can reshape regional hierarchies. Egypt’s policy shows its dual instinct: to stabilize its immediate periphery while avoiding deep entanglement in another open-ended conflict. The aim is not expansion but insulation. By maintaining Sudan as a manageable buffer zone that safeguards Egyptian water, borders and influence without overextending its limited economic capacity. The Humanitarian Dimension The war in Sudan has created the world's largest and fastest-growing humanitarian crisis according to the United Nations. Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has devastated Khartoum and Darfur, collapsing state institutions and displacing millions. Over the past 18 months, the civil war has claimed over 150.000 lives. According to UN estimates, by late 2025 over ten million Sudanese have been forced from their homes, and more than one million have crossed into Egypt through the Argeen and Qustul border posts. Cairo, already under economic strain, now faces the challenge of managing an influx of refugees that outnumbers its formal asylum infrastructure. The government allows many to enter on temporary permits but most receive little organized support beyond overstretched host communities in Aswan and Cairo. For Egypt, this humanitarian crisis has direct strategic consequences. It reinforces the urgency of stabilising Sudan—not only to stop further refugee flows but also to prevent the conflict from disrupting Nile cooperation or spilling violence northward. At the same time, it gives Cairo new leverage with European partners, particularly the EU, which views Egypt as a frontline state for migration containment. The refugee situation thus becomes both a burden and a bargaining tool: evidence of Egypt’s role as a regional stabilizer, but also a reminder of how humanitarian crises now intersect with the geopolitics of aid, migration, and border security in a fragmenting world order. Africa’s multilateral organisations, the African Union (AU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), offer Egypt both a platform and a constraint. As global structures transform and regional institutions gain relative weight, Cairo uses its African memberships to anchor itself in a more multipolar system while counterbalancing dependency on the Gulf and Western partners to varying degrees of success. Fragmentation is rewarding of regional initiative and Egypt does so through their participation in the AU and COMESA. These vehicles give it visibility and a chance at continental coordination. By leaning into an African identity it wins regional legitimacy, positions the state as a bridge between North-Africa, Sub-Saharan African and the Arab world and provides Egypt with a stage on the border of all three to make it into a new center of power. Likewise, Egypt functions as the gateway for trade between three continents, benefitting the Suez canal revenues and through COMESA allowing Egypt access to a market of over 500 million people. If Egypt finds a way to merge its protectionist tendencies with COMESA's relatively liberal trade agenda, it could prove itself Africa's major arena of power. Using both the AU and COMESA to remain economically and politically center stage in a decentralized system will likely be climbin up on Egypt's strategic agenda in the near future. The Gulf Another medium-sized power that seeks autonomy within the shifting power centers is Saudi Arabia. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Egypt is marked by their shared vulnerabilities and ambitions, rather than a pan-Arab identity. Fragmentalization and the decline of clear US dominance makes way for both medium-sized powers to enhance and expand their spheres of influence. Both states view regime stability as a priority, supporting autoritarian models of governance across the MENA region. For both Saudi Arabia and Egypt the Red Sea, specifically Bab al-Mandab, is one of their main arenas of (competing) power. Both want to counter Iranian and Houthi influence and want to protect shipping routes for themselves and global trade. Both states understand the importance of good relations between them: Egypt's regional, cultural, religious weight and access to trade routes is indispensible to Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom also stands to gain much from stable footing on the Africa continent as this gives it the necessary legitimacy. In turn, Saudi investments, labor opportunities and tourism offer Egypt a lifeline in economically challenging times, as well as an opportunity to diversify its overreliance on the West and China. Their interests diverge though not far from this. Saudi Arabia is setting itself up to be the Arab heavyweight in the regional while Egypt sets out to be a Arab heavyweight. The same areas of shared interests become the background for regional tension: leadership over security in the Red Sea area, Saudi Arabia's Africa policy and Egyptian religious and cultural influence become tools with which both states behind the scenes actively compete against one another. In a fragmenting global order where power is dispersed across regional centers, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have built one of the Middle East’s most coherent partnerships; anchored in shared authoritarian stability, economic interdependence, and mutual ambitions across Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Both states champion a state-driven, anti-Islamist governance model and have cooperated to contain political Islam in Libya, Sudan and elsewhere. Their economic complementarity reinforces this alignment: Egypt relies on Gulf capital and investment from Emirati sovereign funds and firms such as ADQ, ADIA, Mubadala, DP World and Masdar, while the UAE depends on Egypt for food security, labor and maritime stability. Together they function as a regional mini-bloc pursuing influence in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, Libya, and emerging African markets. These are arenas that are increasingly shaped by regional, not global, powers. Despite this cohesion friction, of course, persists. The UAE’s rapid normalization with Turkey contrasts with Egypt’s cautious stance; Emirati ventures in Ethiopia, Somaliland and Sudan sometimes clash with Cairo’s Nile-centered security priorities; and UAE advocacy for privatization and structural reform often collides with Egypt’s military-dominated political economy. These differences are magnified by growing scrutiny of Emirati behavior in Sudan, where United Nations investigators deemed credible the allegations that the UAE supplied or facilitated arms transfers to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UN panel based its assessment on evidence of UAE-linked vehicles and weapons in RSF-controlled areas, documented supply routes through Chad and corroboration from independent monitors. Abu Dhabi has categorically denied the charges, claiming the panel mischaracterized its findings. Nonetheless, the controversy exposes the risks of the UAE’s activist regional posture. One that overlaps with Egyptian interests in countering Islamists but diverges over the balance of influence along the Nile corridor. For Egypt, the UAE remains a vital financial stabilizer, political backer, and gateway to global capital; for the UAE, Egypt offers demographic depth, strategic geography, and Arab-African legitimacy. The decline of a single global authority has amplified their partnership, allowing both to act as mutually reinforcing medium powers that project order, secure trade routes and shape outcomes from the Red Sea to North Africa even as controversies like Sudan reveal the tension between regional influence and accountability. The relationship between Qatar and Egypt is best characterized as one of pagmatism. This fits neatly into the theory of fragmentalization as it does not incentivize picking sides. For Qatar, Egypt offers another Arabic-speaking market, both economically and reputationally (the Al-Jazeera network perhaps being the most prominent example). Egypt's strategic location is not only beneficial to Qatar in terms of maritime trade but also allows the Qatar to position itself as another negotiating power. It benefits from the very same stability that Egypt is looking for on its nothern, southern and western borders, as well as its Red Sea coast. This has been proven in 2008 with the Doha Agreement and notably in January of this year when both Egypt and Qatar (alongside the US) were able to broker a ceasefire agreement for Gaza. Aside from being a diplomatic heavyweight, Qatar also has an enormous surplus of capital and a strategic desire to branch out their influence into Africa. For this, partial alignment with Egypt is a non-negotiable. Their shared interests do diverge outside of economic and diplomatic terms, though. Where Egypt can find partners that, to some level, it ideologically agrees with in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar is the clear outlier when it comes to anti-Islamist governance models. Qatar has been a notable supporter of Islamist political actors in North-Africa, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, both in and outside of Egypt. With Qatar-based members of the Muslim Brotherhood having been accused of aiding terror attacks on Egyptian soil by the government, it is clear that ideologically the two do not align. Medium-sized powers in the MENA region, including Egypt, are still wary of Qatar's influence and political agenda following the Qatar diplomatic crisis. Though the crisis has been resolved through the al-Ula Declaration in 2021, Egypt turned the rivalry into an issue-specific partnership. It is not only Arab states that must be continously on the lookout for Qatar's regional influence, though. Israel, though not aligned with the Arab league, shares this sentiment with them. Since the 7th of October Israel has also been very critical of Al-Jazeera due to its status as a government funded news network. The relationship between Israel and Egypt is characterized by pragmatic interdependence first and foremost. For both states, security is dependent on the other's ability to contain conflict. This is true for Gaza and the Sinai, but also for the Red Sea corridor and the Eastern Mediterranean. Fragmentation allows both states not to rely on a sole partner but also weakens the support of super powers for them. Neither Israel nor Egypt wants escalation, Israel relies on Egypt to control and prevent militant spillover in Sinai and Egypt relies on intelligence sharing to conduct counterinsurgency operations there. Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat (left) and Israeli prime minister Menachim Begin in 1978 after Camp David results were reached In a fragmenting world order, where authority and influence are dispersed across multiple centers and arenas, Egypt’s relationship with Israel exemplifies how medium-sized powers use flexible, issue-based cooperation to maintain relevance. Egypt’s leverage lies not in economic or technological strength but in its ability to coordinate—or withhold—cooperation in areas vital to Israeli and regional security. This influence is procedural and situational, emerging in the grey zones between diplomacy, security, and humanitarian management. In Sinai, Egypt’s expanded troop presence—beyond the 1979 Camp David limits but permitted by Israel—depends on constant coordination; by adjusting the tempo or depth of this engagement, Cairo can quietly signal approval or pressure without breaching the treaty. In Gaza, where Egypt controls the Rafah crossing and mediates ceasefires and hostage exchanges, its decisions directly shape Israel’s operational flexibility and international exposure. Cairo’s intelligence cooperation—covering Hamas, Sinai insurgents, and smuggling networks from Libya or Sudan—is similarly discretionary, reflecting the fragmented security environment where coordination replaces hierarchy. Even symbolically, Egypt’s status as the first Arab state to make peace with Israel grants it regional and Western legitimacy: subtle shifts in tone or access reverberate widely. This pattern—selective engagement across overlapping arenas of security, diplomacy, and legitimacy—illustrates how fragmentation rewards states like Egypt that can turn limited assets into adaptive leverage, operating as indispensable brokers in a system with no single center of power. In a fragmenting world, fortune favors those who dare not to align themselves with one single bloc of power. The Atlantic Though not directly bordering on the Atlantic, Egypt has always been important to the US and the EU. In recent years, the dispersion of global power also meant that the relationship between Egypt and the European Union has become more pragmatic and transactional. Both actors face overlapping pressures: irregular migration, energy insecurity, and regional instability across the Mediterranean. Europe’s inability over the past decades to coordinate a unified migration policy and its declining U.S. security umbrella have made Egypt indispensable as a frontline partner. Egypt manages its borders, hosts over a million refugees and acts as a stabilising force along routes leading to Europe. It uses their central role at the crossing of Africa, Asia and Europe to secure political legitimacy and financial support from different (and sometimes competing) benefactors. Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has accelerated Europe’s diversification away from Russian gas, subsequently resulting in Egypt’s importance as an energy hub increasing. It has done so through its liquefied natural gas terminals and participation in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The blurs the line between trade and security and is a clear example of fragmentation pushing geopolitics into new arenas such as supply chains and infrastructure. Climate and water diplomacy, both highly placed on the European agenda, offer another field of alignment. Egypt’s lead in COP27 and its Nile-basin initiatives complement the EU’s Global Gateway and Green Deal strategies. Nevertheless, the relation remains asymmetric. The EU seeks governance reforms and human rights progress, Egypt prioritizes regime stability and steady financial inflows. For Cairo, ties with Europe are part of their previously mentioned diversification strategy. It balances Gulf and Chinese dependence and maintaining its image as a stabilizer between three continents. From Brussels' point of view, Egypt is both a necessity and a dilemma they face. Egypts presence on the world stage is simply too central to ignore, but also too authoritarian for European terms. In a fragmented order, this relationship cannot be sustained by shared values rather its foundation is converging needs, control of migration flows, energy trade and regional stability. These factors have replaced ideology as the real currencies of influence. In a fragmenting world, fortune favors those who dare not to align themselves with one single bloc of power. In the case of Egypt, the decline of the United States as the single global power means their relationship has shifted from alliance to managed interdependence. The U.S. still views Egypt as a cornerstone of regional stability and an essential partner for maintaining the Camp David peace framework, securing the Suez Canal and Red Sea trade routes, combating terrorism and managing escalation around Gaza and the Sinai. Yet in an era of dispersed power, Washington’s priorities have broadened beyond the Middle East toward Asia and global system competition with China, creating strategic space that Egypt uses to assert greater autonomy. Cairo continues to rely on American military aid, training and political cover in Western institutions, but it no longer treats the U.S. as its primary guarantor. Instead, Egypt leverages the relationship to reinforce its indispensability—cooperating on counterterrorism, Gaza mediation, and maritime security while diversifying its partnerships with the Gulf, China, and Russia. This dynamic fits the logic of fragmentation: the two states remain linked by necessity, but Egypt calibrates its alignment issue by issue, extracting resources and legitimacy without full policy convergence. For the U.S., engaging Egypt means maintaining influence in a region where American leverage is waning. For Egypt, maintaining the relationship ensures continued military capacities and diplomatic relevance, even as it manoeuvres within a multipolar environment. The result is a pragmatic, conditional partnership that's ultimately rooted in stability and security cooperation. A partnership where both sides recognize the limits of their influence in an increasingly decentralized world order. Asia In my previous article the discussion of a changing world order was placed within the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 2025 summit. But Asian ambitions to diversify and expand their areas of influence are obvious in the MENA region, too. In the Spring of 2025, Egypt and China undertook their first joint air force training 'Eagles of Civilization'. Through the eyes of analytics the message was clear: China is asserting their military dominance and letting us know Egypt does not subscribe to one bloc. Egypt’s relationship with China has evolved into one of pragmatic alignment and mutual benefit. Both states gain from a system no longer dominated by Western influence: Beijing advances its global reach through infrastructure, trade and technology, while Cairo uses Chinese engagement to diversify partnerships and lessen reliance on the United States and Gulf funding. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Egypt has become a strategic hub connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe, centered on projects such as the Suez Canal Economic Zone, industrial complexes, and new logistics networks. For Egypt, Chinese investment provides much-needed capital to sustain growth and regime stability, even as it risks deepening financial and technological dependence. For China, Egypt offers secure access to the Suez route and Mediterranean markets, along with a politically stable partner in a turbulent region that also finds itself resonating with China's authoritarian character. This partnership embodies the logic of fragmentation: cooperation is flexible, interest-driven, and non-ideological, rooted in shared pragmatism rather than formal alliance. Egypt values China’s principle of non-interference, while Beijing sees Cairo as a useful supporter of South–South cooperation and multipolar governance reforms. Despite the imbalance of power, Egypt uses its geography and strategic relevance to maintain leverage, positioning itself between global actors to extract benefits from each. In this way, Sino-Egyptian relations illustrate how medium-sized and super powers navigate a decentralized order—balancing dependence with agency in a world defined by competing networks of influence. Further north, Russia finds itself isolated from the world stage. Egypt’s relationship with Russia thus reflects a convergence of pragmatism and strategic necessity. Both states seek autonomy from Western dominance and value flexible partnerships that operate outside traditional alliance structures. For Egypt, Russia provides diversification in arms, energy and diplomacy. While for Moscow, Cairo offers an entry point into the Middle East and North Africa, proximity to key maritime routes and a politically stable partner amid growing isolation from the West. Military cooperation remains central: Egypt continues to purchase Russian hardware and conduct joint exercises, even as Western sanctions complicate logistics. The relationship also extends into nuclear energy, through the El Dabaa power plant and agricultural trade, as Russia is one of Egypt’s primary wheat suppliers. These links have become more important since the war in Ukraine reshaped global supply chains and pushed Moscow to deepen ties across Africa. The emergence of the Africa Corps - Russia’s rebranded network of military and paramilitary partnerships replacing the Wagner Group - underscores this shift. Cairo views it cautiously: while Russian security presence in Libya, Sudan and the Sahel could stabilize areas near Egypt’s borders, it also risks undermining Cairo’s own influence in Africa. Within this fragmented order, Egypt’s approach is calculated: it cooperates with Moscow where interests align, particularly in food security, energy, and regional mediation, but avoids alignment that would jeopardize its relations with Western or Gulf partners. The result is a transactional, multi-layered partnership emblematic of fragmentation itself where Egypt balances engagement with Russia to preserve autonomy and extract strategic gains in a world no longer governed by a single pole of power. Further south another, another super power is gaining importance. India in many ways is similar to Egypt. Both states navigate between major blocs, preferring flexible, interest-based engagement over rigid alignments. India is increasingly ambiguous in its position in global politics. It maintains its ties with both the West and Russia while also asserting leadership in the Global South. This makes it an appealing partner for Egypt, which similarly is performing a balancing act amongst American, Chinese, Gulf and European interests. The two states share an interest in reshaping multilateralism to reflect southern voices. This is clear through Egypt’s observer role in BRICS and India’s outreach to African and Arab partners through initiatives such as the India–Africa Forum Summit. Economically, India’s expanding technological and manufacturing base aligns with Egypt’s ambition to diversify beyond construction and low-skill sectors. Indian investment and technology transfer in information technology, pharmaceuticals and renewable energy. These are fields that could effectively strengthen Egypt’s drive toward digital transformation and industrial upgrading. At the same time India profits from Egypt’s geographic position and trade agreements with Africa and Europe which offer it a strategic export gateway. Cooperation emerges across overlapping arenas such as trade, technology and energy and allows both states to benefit from explicitly not aligning strictly to a bloc of power. India and Egypt benefit from positioning themselves as mediators between developed and developing worlds, leveraging their size and neutrality to engage multiple partners. The India–Egypt relationship shows us how fragmentation enables mid-level and super powers to use ambiguity and complementarity as instruments of strategy, linking India’s technological and market potential with Egypt’s connectivity and diplomatic reach to carve out space in an increasingly multipolar global system. Egypt is becoming an influential player in a world where power is no longer held by one dominant bloc but spread across many competing centers. Egypt benefits from its location, its diplomatic ties and its involvement in key regions like the Red Sea and the Nile Basin. These strengths help it work flexibly with different partners depending on the issue. At the same time, Egypt faces major internal challenges: high unemployment, an economy heavily dependent on construction projects and significant reliance on foreign loans. These pressures push Cairo to seek support from a wide range of partners - including the Gulf states, Europe, the United States, China, Russia and India - making foreign policy closely tied to economic survival. Regionally, Egypt must manage security risks in Sudan and Ethiopia while also dealing with cooperation and competition with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Israel. Overall, Egypt’s approach is shaped by pragmatism and a desire to stay independent in a fast-changing world. Egypt’s future role as a key medium power depends on whether it can turn its balancing strategy into long-term strength. Its geography and partnerships give it important influence, but its domestic weaknesses still limit what it can do. If Egypt uses its varied relationships to support real economic improvement, it can secure a stronger place in the emerging multipolar system. If not, it may remain important but will find itself more influenced by global shifts than actively shaping them. In the next article, we will take a closer look at the nuclear power balance in the Middle East and how it relates to the fragmentation theory in practice. 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By: Manuela Medeiros The seventh century was an eyewitness to the meteoric rise of Islam from an insecure monotheistic movement in the Arabian Peninsula to a transcontinental empire stretching from the exotic coast of India to the depths of the Atlantic Ocean. By the end of the century, the Islamic Caliphate had recouped the Sassanian Empire and wrested vast territories from Byzantium. This expansion, within geographical celerity and ideological impact—has sparked debate among scholars for centuries. Was it primarily due to military conquest, political opportunity, or religious appeal? This essay argues that the expansion of Islam in the seventh century is best explained through an interplay of military strategy, political conditions, economic motivations, and the compelling nature of Islam’s religious and social values. These factors, acting in the concert, enabled Islam not only to spread swiftly but to take root across diverse cultures and societies.  Marshall Hodgson proposed that “Islamic history must be understood in its full complexity, as a religious, political, and cultural force.” (Hodgson 143) Thus, to properly account for the Islamic expansion in the seventh century, one must fathom the context of the Arabian peninsula. Tribalism characterized pre-Islamic Arabia, lacking any central governmental framework (Crone 135). Allegiance belonged to clan and tribe, and conflicts between tribes were frequent. This wrought a void of power that Islam was legally and morally equipped to occupy. Starting in 622 CE, the Prophet Muhammad's leadership in Medina established a particular model of governance that combined tribal allegiance with religious devotion (Donner 44)—successfully creating the first Islamic state. Muhammad was not solely a prophet, but also a politician. His achievement in creating coalitions among conflicting tribes in Medina via the Constitution of Medina established the foundation for a multi-tribal Islamic political entity (Donner 76). By adopting a mesh of strategic treaties, military measures, and social changes, Muhammad swiftly brought a significant portion of the Arabian Peninsula under Islamic regime up until his passing in 632 CE.  Fig 1. A map illustrating the rise and expansion of early Islamic caliphates from the Prophet Muhammad until the 9th century. From charitable giving (zakāt), egalitarianism (at least in spiritual terms), and support for orphans and the underprivileged–Islam was rewriting social norms. With the provided ideological structure for domination and collaboration, Islamic principles offered a supra-tribal identity that united countless groups under a shared purpose, integrating tribal identities into the broader ummah (community of believers) and promoting unity (Donner, Muhammad and the Believers  44).   Throughout the sixth century, Arabia hosted a wide spectrum of beliefs: polytheism, Christianity, Judaism , Zoroastrianism and Hanif monotheism. Within that context, Arabs were already disillusioned with polytheism and attracted to monotheistic ideas. Islam’s emphasis on moral principles, social justice, and a direct relationship with God that resonated deeply in a thirst for religious reform (Crone 135).   Following the Prophet’s passing, the Rashidun (Rightly Guided) Caliphate (632-661 CE) and then the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 CE) oversaw the bulk of Islamic territorial expansion. Their triumph cannot be solely attributed solely to religious ardour. It was a matter of opportunity, skill, and historical contingency.  In regard to the Byzantine and the Sasanian empires, both were weakened by decades of mutual warfare, plague and internal dissent. The Sassanians collapsed entirely by 651 CE, while Byzantium lost control of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa. Local populations, particularly Monophysite Christians and Jews, were often ostracised from their rulers and viewed Muslim armies not as conquerors but as liberators who had considerably more religious tolerance and lower taxation.     Arab armies were bound by size but highly mobile and well-adapted to desert warfare. Commanders like Khalid ibn al-Wadid used hasty cavalry tactics and remarkable knowledge of local terrain to outmaneuver larger, better-equipped opposing forces as illustrated by the tactics employed in the Battle of Yarmouk (636 CE) and Qadisiyyah (636 CE), both decisive victories that broke Byzantine and Persian resistance, respectively (Kennedy 88).  While the idea of jihad has been interpreted in many ways, in the seventh century, it offered a religious basis for military growth. Combatants were frequently assured lively incentives following their duty, and the gains from conflict were divided, rendering involvement both materially and spiritually appealing. On the other hand, numerous conquests were more pragmatic than based on ideology.  The world of conquest and expansion was not only limited to militia–it amounted to economics as well. Once controlled by the Byzantines and the Sassnians, the lucrative routes were effectively dominated by the early Caliphate (Crone 135). From Damascus to Alexandria, and later Baghdad–those key commercial routes were quickly coming into Islamic authority and the Caliphate found itself at the heart of international trade linking the East and the West. Enabling the dissemination of Islamic culture, language and administrative practices–these elaborate trails also brought wealth in the form of taxes and spoils.  Moreover, economic incentives were systematically institutionalized. The introduction of jizya (a tax levied on non-muslim crowds) and the kharaj (land tax) set the stage for a strong economic rationale for preserving religious identity and diversity within the empire (Crone 135). Converts to Islam were exempts for jizya, which, while encouraging conversion, also reinforced the pragmatic coexistence of different faiths within the Islamic territories. The administrative adoption of diwan registers-bureaucratic systems adapted from Persian and Roman traditions–allowed for efficient tax collections, resource allocation and military organisation.    The elite and military veterans of Arabian society were often granted land in conquered land, which not only secured loyalty but also incentivised settlement and long-term integration. These economic reforms ensured that Islamic rule was not only sustainable but also attractive, encouraging cooperation from local populations and former elites. As Patricia Crone observed, “Islam spread not just on the tip of a sword but also by the promise of a more equitable and efficient system of governance.” Despite the remarkable military and economic contributions to its expansion, the religious and ethical message of Islam was a foundational element of its spread. The unity of God (tawhid) (The Qur’an 112:1-4), the brotherhood of believers, and personal accountability of Islam's theological emphasis before God resonated with diverse crowds, in particular those who felt unsatisfied with hierarchical complexities and doctrinal divisions amongst existing religions (Crone 135).  Through the concept of ahl al-kitab (people of the book), allowed Islam to offer a more straightforward creed and tolerance of other monotheistic faiths–which was different to the Byzantine Empire, where theological disputes such as the nature of Christ's birth often resolute in persecution. This inclusivity was host to cultural integration rather than obliteration (Cook 59). Gradually, Islam was then adopted not at the point of the sword but through trade, intermarriage, administrative service, and intellectual exchange. Later seen as vehicles of social mobility and prestige, the Arabic language and Islamic culture were seen as symbols of innovation and growth.  Written in the eloquent and poetic language of Arabic–the Quran itself became a literary and cultural magnet under Islamic rule expansion. After facilitating the standardisation of language, laws and education–the Quran's linguistic beauty and ethical vision provided a powerful unifying cultural force. Cultural and ideological stability across vast and ethnically diverse territories was further then maintained (Cook 59).  As the empire expanded, coupled with the codification of the Qur’an in a written and recited form and the spread of Arabic language, the Islamic identity in the social and intellectual fabric became embedded into its empirical profile. Through mosque-based education, Qur’anic schools, and the translation of ancient texts into Arabic, Islam positioned itself not merely as a religious tradition, but as a comprehensive civilisational force (Cook 59).  By being incentivised by cultural prestige, administrative benefits, and sincere spiritual appeal–conversion was often gradual. Thus, the religious and ideological coherence of Islam helped solidify its dominance. Guided by the adaptability and universalism embedded in Islamic doctrine, mass conversions did not occur immediately in Persia and North Africa but instead, unfolded over decades. An inspiration to many diverse interpretations from historians across different schools of thought and centuries–the expansion of Islam was emphasized by a spectrum of narratives. In spite of earlier accounts of emphasized religious zeal or divine providence, multi-causal explanations alongside balancing material conditions, ideological appeal, and geopolitical crisis are preferred by the modern scholarship.  A redefinition of the relationship between religion and governance is argued by history; Islam's fusion of ethical monotheism with statecraft created a “new kind of polity”, Hodgson argues. Rather than viewing expansion through a solely military lens, in his seminal work The Venture of Islam, underscores the civilizational scale of the birth of Islam. An avid outliver of its Arab origins, the early caliphate's capacity to unify diverse tribal and urban elements under a coherent moral order, created what was a portable and translatable model of governance (Crone 135).   Through the legitimization of ideology and the binding of social force–the notion of umma (a divinely ordained community of believers) was contended by Fred Donner in The Early Islamic Conquests . Alongside political consolidation, a gradual solidification of its religious character emerged as a “believers’ movement” within the alternate suggestion that Islamic history was not to be solely looked at by a religious lens.  Owing more to its ideological structure and Muhmmads charisma than to pre-existing economic frameworks, Patricia Crone, while critical of certain traditional Islamic accounts, challenges the assumption that Mecca was a major trading hub in Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Whilst maintaining tribal loyalties through the distribution of ghanimah (spoils) and military stipends (‘ ata’ ), Crone emphasizes the strategic brilliance of the early caliphs creating a system that simultaneously incentivized both loyalty and expansion.  Narrated by a leading authority on early Islamic history, Hugh Kennedy frames the seventh-century conquests as a remarkable feat of coordination. Whilst respecting the significance of the institutional flexibility of the caliphate, Kennedy underscores the strategic pragmatism of commanders such as Khalid ibn al-Walid and Amr ibn al-’As (Kennedy 88). With an overwhelmingly remarkable capacity to adapt Roman and Sassanian administrative practices, Islam's successes with co-opting local elites, maintaining tax systems, and preserving social hierarchies were expedient–greatly contributed to its expansional success.  Serving as a symbol of cultural and legal unification, the Quran's importance is stressed by Michael Cook in The Koran: A Very Short Introduction. After defining community boundaries, regulating economic transactions and establishing prototypes for conflict resolution–the Quran served not only as a scripture but as a catalyst to the spread of Islam.  Driven by a rather growing scholarly consensus that Islam's expansion was diverse, a hypothesis that institutional pragmatism, historical opportunity, dynamic leadership and coherent ideology is birthed. Whilst playing a critical role in the sustained growth of the early Islamic world, the religious alongside military and economic aspects of Islam's rise were mutually reinforcing. Such an expansion was not a historical accident or caused by a singular factor–whether it was military prowess or religious fervour–the Islamic expansion was the product of external opportunity and a unique convergence of internal cohesion. Offering a rich context of promised justice, unity, and moral clarity–Islam emerged in a politically and religiously fluid Arabian milieu. Islam was beyond a theological doctrine, it was a new socio-political order (The Qur’an 4:135). From the Prophet Muhammad to the Rashidun and Umayyad caliphs, the early Muslim leadership was capitalised on geopolitical understanding, sophisticated military strategy and pragmatic policy (Donner 76).   While it is tempting to attribute the Islamic expansion purely to conquest, such a view fails to recognise the depth of transformation that occurred in its wake. The receptiveness of local populations, internal divisions within neighbouring empires and their decline–molded military victories. Yet Islam's power transcended conquest. From the Coptic Christians of Egypt to the Zoroastrians of Persia–Islam's institutional adaptability allowed it to resonate across different cultures. By maintaining relative religious tolerance and the integration of existing administrative systems, the early caliphate helped facilitate the transition from empire to civilisation.  Illuminated by a spectrum of historical insight, the complexity behind this meteoric rise, summons an urge to view early Islam not merely as a faith, but as a transformative force. From Donner to Hodgson, it was precisely this multidimensionality that made Islam's expansion not only rapid, but everlasting.   In the final analysis, the best account of Islam’s seventh-century expansion is one that embraces its intricacy. It was the symbiosis of sword and scripture, statecraft and spirituality, contingency and conviction, that enabled a small desert movement to become one of the most influential forces in world history. Works Cited  Anastasi, Luciano. 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Donner, Fred M.   Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam.  Harvard University Press, 2010. Donner, Fred M.   The Early Islamic Conquests.  Princeton University Press, 1981. Hodgson, Marshall G. S.   The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization.  Vol. 1, University of Chicago Press, 1974. Kennedy, Hugh.   The Great Arab Conquests .      Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 9 Dec. 2010.

Written by: Huitzil David López Sánchez Since October 2023, Gaza has endured one of the most devastating military assaults in history. Countless Palestinians have lost everything, while people across the globe, from courageous journalists to activists like Greta Thunberg, have raised their voices in protest. Israel launched a full-scale assault on the Gaza Strip, combining aerial bombardments, a ground invasion, and a total blockade of electricity, food, fuel, and medical aid. Gaza burns; bombs fall; and civilians of all ages are dying. According to official reports, children have been the most affected. UNICEF has described Gaza as “the most dangerous place in the world to be a child.” “A year into Israel’s assault, Gaza stands in ruins—over 18,000 children killed, millions displaced, and the world still divided between silence and witness.” Two years after the violence began, governments remain indifferent, many people refuse to confront the reality, and cold hearts continue to be blinded by hatred. To date, more than 200 journalists and media workers have lost their lives in Gaza since the conflict began. Among the most recent victims was Mariam Abu Dagga (August 25, 2025), a visual journalist for the Associated Press and Independent Arabia, killed at Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis while documenting the humanitarian crisis. Fig 1. Live updates: Israel’s allies call for winding down of assault in Gaza On October 6, 2025, Israel deported 171 activists, including Swedish activist Greta Thunberg and individuals from Greece and Slovakia. The deportations reflect a wider pattern of human rights violations, as Israel obstructs humanitarian aid and flotillas attempting to deliver essential supplies. Despite these attempts to silence them, activists continue to raise their voices. “They dragged little Greta by her hair in front of us, beat her, and forced her to kiss the Israeli flag. They did everything imaginable to her as a warning to others,” said Turkish activist Ersinçelik, a participant in the Sumud Flotilla. What happened to Greta Thunberg is a stark reminder: if a world-renowned activist can be treated this way, what horrors are ordinary Palestinians facing? Yet, Greta emerged from her ordeal with remarkable resilience. She spoke out immediately, demonstrating courage and determination, as if the abuse had only strengthened her resolve. Greta embodies the power of resistance and social change. Her example shows that if we all raise our voices for our Palestinian brothers and sisters, we can pressure governments to condemn the genocide and call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. While international organizations wield significant influence, control does not guarantee action. Each individual can contribute: sharing information, participating in boycotts against products funding violence, and demanding accountability can create a global impact greater than any single government or organization. Humanity must unite to defend its shared moral obligations. Two years into this humanitarian catastrophe, the world can no longer afford indifference. Every child killed, every hospital destroyed, every voice silenced is a reminder that inaction equals complicity. Bearing witness is no longer optional, it is a moral imperative. “We cannot take our eyes away from Gaza… our international organizations are betraying the Palestinians; they do not even have the capacity to prevent the worst war crimes.”, Greta Thunberg works cited: UNICEF reported that, since the conflict began in October 2023, over 50,000 children have been killed or injured in the Gaza Strip: https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unimaginable-horrorsmore-50000-children-reportedly-killed-or-injured-gaza-strip The UN Security Council condemned the acts that resulted in civilian deaths during the Israeli operation against a humanitarian convoy to Gaza, urging investigations: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/autoinsert-194228/ The UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Israeli attack on the flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza presented a report to the Human Rights Council, emphasizing the peaceful nature of the flotilla and the need to investigate human rights violations: https://www.ohchr.org/en/pressreleases/2010/09/fact-finding-mission-israeli-attack-flotilla-carryinghumanitarian The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern over the situation in Gaza and requested access to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories to investigate human rights violations: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/opt/2024 1106-Gaza-Update-Report-OPT.pdf Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, has documented atrocities in Gaza and urged the international community to protect civilians and ensure respect for international law: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/genocide-as-colonial-erasurereport-francesca-albanese-01oct24/

by Tiago Caixado During the twentieth century, the Left took control of Western democracies to determine their moral and political path. The Left maintained a specific goal to establish equality in a capital-based world through Attlee's British welfare state and Roosevelt's New Deal in America as well as Mitterrand's France and the Scandinavian system. The political power base that existed before the twenty-first century began has completely vanished during the first half of this new century.  The Western world faces a complete breakdown of centre-left and progressive political parties throughout its entire region. The British public received Keir Starmer's Labour government with high hopes for a victorious comeback but they now criticize the administration for its lack of strong leadership and its focus on administrative matters. Starmer has focused on technocratic governance during his time in office through his implementation of cautious policy changes and his focus on fiscal management and his pursuit of political acceptability. The party has lost its core beliefs which made young voters choose Jeremy Corbyn and Zarah Sultana's new political group called "Your Party." The Corbyn-Sultana movement exists as an early stage yet it demonstrates the current split within the Left because some members want practical leadership while others want to uphold their ethical principles. The collapse is not confined to Britain. The Socialist Party of France exists in a diminished form because it controls only a few seats in the National Assembly. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally now controls the working-class vote which used to belong to the Left, while President Macron leads as a centrist who lacks any clear political direction. The Left currently faces two major issues because it has lost its ability to communicate effectively and its core supporters have abandoned it according to Le Monde.  The Social Democrats remain in power through their coalition with the Greens and Free Democrats yet their polling numbers show signs of becoming extremely low. The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz encounters mounting public disapproval because his administration lacks clear direction and living expenses continue to rise and his leadership style seems detached from representing any specific group. The Greens political party in Germany suffered harm to their reputation because they supported military aid to Ukraine which upset their pacifist supporters. According to Der Spiegel, nearly half of Green voters now identify as “politically homeless.” Perhaps the most striking case is Spain, where the radical-left project Podemos has virtually collapsed. The insurgent energy of the past ten years has disappeared into the mainstream Socialist Party under Pedro Sánchez. The political movement started with a strong vision for change but ended up splitting into conflicting factions. The centre-left forces in Italy lost their power when Giorgia Meloni's right-wing coalition took control by using nationalist rhetoric to capture the populist support which the Left previously harnessed.  Why has this happened? The answer is as much cultural as political. The modern Left has lost its grip on material politics:wages, rents, jobs and replaced it with a moralized, hyper-cultural discourse that resonates mostly with educated urban elites. The Western working class which supported the Left for many years no longer finds their interests represented by the party's current goals. The Economist explained in June 2025 that "the Left focuses on recognition while the Right centers on survival."  Globalisation, too, reshaped the political terrain. The Left once balanced internationalism with protection of domestic industry. The leaders of today seem to back globalization despite many citizens linking it to growing social inequality and rising insecurity. Digital disinformation along with growing political polarization and weakening trade union power have become major challenges. There is also the question of authenticity. The Right has established itself as the voice of rebellion through populist rhetoric. The Left has turned into defenders of the institutions they once fought against when they tried to change academia and bureaucracy and international organizations. Its leaders speak the language of inclusion but often act with the cold precision of technocrats. The consequence is a vacuum. Across Europe and North America, voters who once trusted the Left to challenge power now look elsewhere. The drifting population splits into two groups based on their search for safety in established norms and their decision to become disinterested in the world. The Left has lost its moral purpose of empowering the powerless because of political slogans, social media “purity tests” and meaningless online discussions.  The Left in Western societies has faced a gradual disappearance which results from multiple instances of betrayal and strategic retreats and weakened intellectual positions. Its obituary is being written not by its enemies, but by its own exhaustion. The Left needs to find a way to reconnect with material reality through class language rather than clique language or it will become a forgotten movement that failed to die fighting but instead faded away quietly. Works Cited: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2025/10/07/france-s-left-more-fragmented-than-ever-after-lecornu-s-resignation_6746176_5.html?utm https://www.developmenteducationreview.com/sites/default/files/Issue%2038%20Full%20Word%20Formatted.pdf?utm https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/10/03/pedro-sanchez-clings-to-office-at-a-cost-to-spains-democracy?utm

By: Anna Campelo When the atomic bomb was initially dropped on Hiroshima, followed three days later by a second bombing on Nagasaki, back in 1945, the world witnessed not only destruction but the emergence of a new order. Nuclear power was now the ultimate currency of sovereignty — an insurance for regimes, a shortcut to status, and, paradoxically, an emblem of "rational deterrence." For decades, this privilege seemed reserved for an exclusive club. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty offered a deal: the nuclear powers would one day disband their arsenals, and the rest of the world committed not to pursue them. It was the fragile architecture of a bipolar era, where fear itself was stabilizing. The mushroom cloud rising over Hiroshima after the detonation of ‘Little Boy,’ 1945 — marking the dawn of the nuclear age. (Source: U.S. Army via National Archives and Records Administration - NARA) and medium-sized states are quietly reconsidering what the atom can do for them. From Saudi Arabia's subtle nuclear advances to Uzbekistan's civilian power ambitions, from Iran's enrichment milestones to Kazakhstan's growing anxiety, a subtle but revealing pattern emerges: the re-emergence of nuclear temptation as an insurance policy against geopolitical exposure. In the wake of the Soviet implosion, it was believed by many that nuclear disarmament had triumphed as a moral as well as strategic consensus. South Africa dismantled its secret arsenal, and Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus gave up the inherited warheads. Optimism after the Cold War relied on the belief that interdependence and globalization would replace deterrence with diplomacy. History, nevertheless, has not been kind to optimism. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 sent a sobering message: regimes without nuclear deterrence could be overthrown at whim. In geopolitical terms, non-proliferation had become a luxury of the secure. The lesson was not lost on the global periphery. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs argue in The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation , lesser states will pursue nuclear programs not out of expansionism, but because they are existentially threatened. Possessing (or at least approaching) the nuclear threshold is then a tool of strategic ambiguity, a deterrent without announcement. Iran's insistence that its program is civilian fits precisely this logic: by enriching uranium to 60%, Tehran is showing both defiance and deterrence. Saudi Arabia, on its part, proposes to pursue nuclear energy "to match any regional rival," and Uzbekistan's cooperation with Russia to construct small modular reactors is another dimension, nuclear energy as a symbol of technological modernity and geopolitical sovereignty. In Central Asia, this trend suggests the ongoing shadow of empire. Post-Soviet states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan balance their relations between Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, each of which offers different forms of strategic partnership. By seeking nuclear cooperation, these states demonstrate their ability to engage directly with great powers, exercising agency within the multipolar order. For Russia, supporting such projects serves its own interests: export of technology, creation of dependency, and extension of influence through nuclear diplomacy rather than force. This shift mirrors what most analysts now call the post-hegemonic order, an order no longer supported by one superpower but by competitive pluralism. In this situation, small and medium powers hedge their bets. They diversify alliances, seek dual-use technologies, and create "strategic latency": the technical ability to go nuclear if necessary, but not yet. The distinction between civilian and military capability is deliberately blurred. The implications are extensive. For one, the moral authority of the non-proliferation order is eroding. The NPT deal, that the nuclear powers would disarm, has been repeatedly betrayed, whether by US modernization plans or Russian nuclear saber-rattling in the war in Ukraine. Under such conditions, appeals to restraint ring hollow. As one Kazakh analyst observed, "We gave up our weapons for a promise that was never kept." That frustration resonates across the Global South, where nuclear equality has become another front of postcolonial grievance. The NPT's Fragile Architecture. The map reveals the nuclear-armed nations operating outside the Treaty regime (in red and black), visually demonstrating the erosion of legal commitments in favor of atomic possession as the ultimate security guarantee. (Source: FNSP - Sciences Po / Atelier de cartographie, 2018.) Second, the emergence of middle powers like Turkey, India, Brazil, and South Africa adds to the complexity of enforcement. These states eschew the nuclear/non-nuclear binary in favor of a third way, technological sovereignty, regional power, and political clout. The result is not a new Cold War, but a kaleidoscope of deterrence: diffuse, asymmetric, and ever more unpredictable. Now, nuclear aspiration today coincides with energy security and climate politics. Energy crises, rare earth competition, and the decarbonization race all reinforce a new logic of autonomy. Nuclear energy (especially through small modular reactors) is repackaged today as green and viable. But as history shows, civilian programs can morph into military capability faster than international institutions can react. The International Atomic Energy Agency still has a crucial monitoring role, but institutions built for a bipolar world are not well suited to manage a multipolar one. As the agency itself pointed out in its 2025 report, the rules-based system depends not only on treaties but on trust. And trust, in this geopolitical landscape, is the most elusive commodity of all. Last, the revived nuclear appeal to small states will be driven more by fear than by ambition. It will be a testament to a world where security guarantees are conditional, norms are applied selectively, and power has decentralized and gone performative. The atom, once tamed by treaties and moral restraint, is quietly being reimagined, not as a tool of Armageddon, but as the ultimate vocabulary of sovereignty in a fragmented international order. References • Monteiro, Nuno P., and Alexandre Debs. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2014. • International Atomic Energy Agency. Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors. March 2025. • Iranian President Denies Nuclear Weapons Ambitions After UN Alarm on Uranium Enrichment. People’s Daily, September 2024. • Saudi Arabia Plans to Allow Tougher Nuclear Oversight by IAEA This Year. VOA News, September 2024. • Uzbekistan and Russia to Start Construction of Small Nuclear Power Plants. The Diplomat, May 2024. • Back to the Future? Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Choice. United States Institute of Peace, October 2024.

By: Manuela Medeiros Saigon. The land of the captured and the fallen. A monument of communism, capitalism and pseudo-revolutionaries, an emblem of the American flag in the heart of Vietnam. Viewed by many in the West as heroes and by others across the world as imperial villains, the United States couldn’t escape the fate it helped shape. As President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked: “The ultimate victory will depend on the hearts and minds of the people who actually live out there.”, he appealed to something considerably larger than a military victory, he appealed to the soul of the United States of America, a nation torn between the chaos on domestic soil and a conflict  fifteen thousand km away.  How could a superpower with unmatched military strength ever  lose a war to such a small, ill-equipped nation on the other side of the globe? The Vietnam War was one of the most barbarous world conflicts in modern American history, resulting in the first clear defeat for the United States military.  The U.S had won battles. But failed to win the war.  From 1955 to 1975, the U.S intervened in Vietnam to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, as part of its broader Cold War ‘containment’ doctrine and policy. With intensive military operations and firepower, the United States had never suffered a decisive defeat in direct combat, and yet it miserably failed to achieve its strategic goals. The United States had deployed over half a million troops, conducted decade-long campaigns that cost over 58,000 American lives and stained the nation’s reputation. “The war was not lost in the jungles of Vietnam, but in the living rooms of America — on the night of the Tet Offensive.” hypothesized Christian Appy, a leading historian of this red battle fought within indifference and fear but won with pride and defiance; a victory celebrated in the same soil that once only mourned. A victory fought not only with bullets, but with belief.  This conflict subverts any standard set by American militarism during war—tackled by the unsettling might of guerilla tactics or the unfamiliar terrain; the end point was clear, the U.S. could have never imagined that its terminus would not be in Hanoi, but inside the American mind.  Vietnam shattered the expectations of American militarism. This war was not only against the Viet Cong, it was against American democracy—one defined by uncertainty, protest and distrust. The Viet Cong was fluent in asymmetry, they found beauty in uncertainty and turned it into purpose. The Viet Cong didn’t lack a motive, they fought for what they saw as liberation while the U.S fought for silence; America fought a war it increasingly struggled to justify.  This incongruity has led historians to question not just why  the United States failed, but where the war was truly lost: in the jungles of Vietnam, or in the fractured minds of the American people. While military challenges were significantly  salient, it was ultimately the collapse of political and public support at home, catalyzed by judicious media coverage, social unrest and unthinkable political decisions, that paved the way towards American failure in Vietnam. Despite its resolute position, a recon of how battlefield realities and strategic oversights fed into domestic collapse, showing that the two fronts were deeply interconnected, is essential. In the 21st century, a single tweet can mislead or mobilize millions. The 20th century was no different, though instead of tweets, it was photographs; instead of reels, articles. Media has shaped the public for centuries, beginning with the invention of movable-type press by Johannes Gutenberg in the 1440s. In the following decades, the emergence of the radio and television ushered in a new era of mass communication. By the 1960s, these mediums were broadcasting what became known as  the “first televised war”: the Vietnam War. From the rice paddies of Southeast Asia to the  living rooms of America, the conflict was no longer distant and public perception was altered in media res. The media did not merely report the war; it reframed it.  How could a nation claim victory abroad when it was losing faith at home?   As the media expanded its span of control from America to Vietnam, it began covering other battles and massacres within the war.  A historian might draw on contemporary journalism as a source to outline the public impact of historical events and it was no different during the Vietnam War. Between the lines of the book ‘Embers of War’, a piece of literature exploring the dawn of the Vietnam War, Fredrik Logevall proposes that “The My Lai revelations fundamentally altered public perception —not just of the war, but of the soldiers fighting it.” The My Lai massacre was one of the most significant events of the war, “stripping the war of its last illusions. Americans could no longer tell themselves they were fighting a fair war” writes historian Christian Appy. In March 1968, U.S Army soldiers from Charlie Company brutally murdered over 300 unarmed Vietnamese civilians in the village of My Lai. The victims were young women, children and elderly. The massacre was initially silenced by military command and media control, but in 1969, Seymour Hesh broke the silence; supported by photographs taken by Army photographer Ron Haeberle. As these images were published on the front pages of newspapers across America, public outrage was immediate and visceral. As George Herring notes,“When the photographs of My Lai hit the front pages, they did more than shock: they undermined whatever moral legitimacy the war still had. Fig 1. A soldier burning down a hut in the village of My Lai. The fine grain of detail that the American military attempted to cover up the brutality of this massacre disclosed the reality of militia activity; the U.S was no longer ‘monitoring the situation’, they were no longer just  ‘enforcing containment’, they were erasing Vietnam.  The power of journalism in this case did not merely document massacre—it altered the national consciousness. My Lai had instantly become a multinational symbol of a war gone morally adrift, contradicting the American narrative of democratic liberation.  If we examine remotely the causes of media unrest during the war, My Lai is not the sole culprit in this matter. In the same year, the Tet Offensive derailed the American perception of the war; outlining the lack of strategy within U.S militia as the Viet Cong stormed over 100 cities and 70,000 troops took control over the Nation.  After all, the Vietnam flag is red and yellow for a reason.  Despite being a military dereliction for the North, the scale and shock of the attacks stunned the American public and subverted previous claims that the U.S was near victory. Truth was that “he won’t quit no matter how much bombing we do.” When “history doesn’t repeat itself but it sure does rhyme”, Ho Chi Minh had lived through this very war in 1946 and in 1954. McNamara was correct, Minh or the Viet Cong wouldn’t quit. As the credited news anchor Walter Cronkite famously declared that the war would end in stalemate, proposing to President Lyndon B. Johnson, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.” This growing “credibility gap” between what officials claimed and what citizens witnessed caused widespread disillusionment. Following the repercussions in 1968, the media shattered a glass Americans never knew about. The media disproved the American government and paved the way for countless manifestos of spite. Military commitment was now politically unsustainable, the war was lost in Suburbia, not in Saigon.  In regards to media coverage, the Vietnam War saw an unprecedented wave of domestic protest. What began as isolated demonstrations by students and intellectuals grew into an unsettling nationwide movement involving veterans, civil rights activists, and even politicians. By the late 1960’s, anti-war protests had become a symbol of American politics. “Make love not war” was now the national anthem of the revolutionary, a battle cry for change.  Fig 2. Caroline Kastle holding a sign in the 1967 Philadelphia Love In protest.  A common misconception about the Vietnam War and its casualties was that killings were carried solely on Vietnamese soil. Conversely, deaths were recorded miles off the coast of Hanoi—from Saigon to Kent State University, no revolutionary mind was safe. In May 1970, National militia opened fire on student protesters—killing four people and further wounding the divide between American society. Draft resistance became widespread, with 50,000 young men fleeing to Canada or burning their draft cards in public. The movement was beyond anti-war but rather anti-establishment; it changed the moral authenticity of the American foreign policy and raised questions about its democracy, imperialism and racism.  As the political pressure reached the streets of Washington, Lyndon B. Johnson announced in March 1968 that he would not seek re-election. His successor, Richard Nixon, campaigned on the grounds of “peace with honor”, reflecting the public desire to end war. In 1971, the leaked Pentagon Papers confirmed that successive administrations had misled the public of the war’s progress, further polluting anti-war sentiment and mistrust, which aimed at pressuring the government to act against the war. Fig 3. Front Pages of the Pentagon Papers published by The Washington Post. Twenty years, five presidents and countless policies. Whether it was the erosion of domestic support or the increasing pressure on policymakers, politics and economics during the Vietnam War was in constant metamorphosis.  Whilst 2.3% of the American GDP went directly into the Vietnam War, Urban needs were left unsatisfied and the population lacked access to basic necessities: infrastructure, housing, transportation, education and healthcare. As reform budgets were cut back due to the war emptying the pockets of the American programs. Johnson’s launched 1964-1965 agenda of a “Greater Society”, aiming at addressing poverty, inequality and racism was an ambitious move that rapidly derailed as the Vietnam War escalated; Johnson was left with a moral dilemma and could no longer sponsor such a program and society was frantic about how the government was spending its money. Fig 4. “We can’t afford two new dresses.” A critique of U.S. war spending at the expense of domestic welfare. Congruent to the fluid economy, Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization—the process of steadily transferring combat responsibilities to South Vietnamese forces (ARVN) while withdrawing U.S troops—was not adopted primarily for strategy, but rather for need. The United States was no longer able  to validate the cost of war, either in dollars or lives. Between 1969 and 1973, American troop counts dropped sharply, and by March 1973, the last U.S combat troops had left Vietnam. Signed in January 1973, The Paris Peace Accords were a direct result of internal American pressure rather than battlefield victories. The American public could no longer support the war, and policymakers had no other choice than to find a diplomatic exit.  In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act, which was aimed at limiting presidential authority over waging war without congressional approval. This act was mostly passed due to American experience in Vietnam, mimicking the long term political fallout of the conflict—confirming that war had not only divided society but had led to a substantial change in the institutional balance of the United States..   In spite of its main argument, this essay recognizes that military and strategic failures played a crucial role in undermining domestic support. The American military was significantly ill-prepared for the type of guerilla warfare practiced by the North. U.S forces often relied on conventional tactics—from large-scale bombings to search and destroy missions, its ineffectiveness causing tremendous civilian harm.  Their usage of chemical agents such as napalm, Agent Orange, and indiscriminate air strikes alienated the locals, subverting the ultimate American objective of “winning hearts and minds.” The South Vietnamese government, under rigorous leaders, was plagued by corruption, inefficiency and an overwhelming lack of legitimacy. The ARVN forces would lack morale and were heavily dependent on American airpower and logistics. The United States was unaware that the usage of these chemicals polluted their image more than it helped—the United States began to be portrayed as aggressors rather than liberators and its actions ignited an ethical crisis. Another symbol of American oversight was the Ho Chi Minh trail—an elaborate supply route running through Laos and Cambodia, which allowed the North to sustain their operations regardless of the heavy bombing. In spite of the 1972 Operation Linebacker or the 1965-1968 Operation Rolling Thunder, the United States perpetually failed in cutting off these supplies which allowed the Viet Cong to transport troops, weapons and supplies to the Southern Front whilst representing the Northern resilience at the face of adversity. The Ho Chi Minh trail highlighted how whilst the United States fought for survival, to simply  go back home—the VietCong fought with purpose—seeking independence for their home . This psychological bridge between Northern and Southern motive was visible to the American eye and the media was aware of the struggle for morale, summoning crowds to side “with the enemy” due to their inspiring battle call.  While the U.S won countless battles, including against the Tet Offensive, it failed to translate these victories into strategy. This persistent failure contributed to the loss of confidence at home. In this sense, the war was not entirely lost in domestic soil—it was also lost in Vietnam where military strategies were no match to political objectives.  After the policy of Vietnamization concluded the withdrawal of U.S troops from Vietnamese bases, it became clear the extent of Southern dependence on American support. Despite billions of dollars in aid and training,  the ARVN proved itself to be unable to resist a major offensive from the Northern militia. The captured land had fallen in April 1975–Saigon had collapsed; marking the official end of war. North Vietnamese tanks rolled into the capital as helicopters evacuated the last Americans from the American embassy. The drastic images of this moment was a shock to the American prestige. Most importantly, the United States chose not to return to the conflict—not due to its military capability, but due to its political and public instability. Congress abstained from the authorization of further military aid, and President Gerald Ford accepted that the war was over. The choice not to re-engage in conflict reflected the prevailing impact of domestic opposition. As Henry Kissinger later noted, “We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one.” An oversimplified approach towards this conflict would be that the war was only lost at home. In reality, the home front and the battlefield were deeply connected. As military failures flashed the news, public support was made harder to maintain—which consequently limited military options. The war had begun its feedback loop: each battlefield misstep eroded confidence at home, and each domestic protest became a constrained strategy abroad.   When recalling the events that unfolded during the My Lai massacre, that bittersweet connection between the battlefield and home is evident. Events similar to My Lai had a disproportionate impact due to its exposé of the moral cost of the war; amplifying the arguments used by the crowd of anti-war activists.   Similarly, the 1971 Pentagon Papers did not reveal any new battlefield failures—instead, they showed how the government had long believed that the war was unwinnable. This revelation destroyed the credibility of the American government and shattered what was left of public trust—confirming that the issue was not solely military, but rather moral and political as well.  The Vietnam War did not end in 1975–it transformed. Its legacy reverberates through every corridor of American policy and every street where protest once roared. In the decades following Saigon’s fall, the conflict became a cautionary tale for both military commanders and political leaders. The “Vietnam Syndrome”—a national resistance against engaging in foreign conflicts without clear objectives or public support—defining American politics for a generation. Presidents from Reagen to Obama navigated this shadow with caution—in Somalia, Rwanda and Iraq; no longer could a government assume that military strength alone would assure success let alone victory. Public consent had become a strategic necessity. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates later reflected, “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia…should have his head examined.”  According to the saying “a good historian always looks at both sides of the conflict”—to fully grasp the reasons as to why the United States failed in Vietnam, it is crucial to move beyond tactical military analysis and examine the deeper historical forces shaping the war’s trajectory. Vietnam was not simply a Cold War battleground, but the stage upon which America’s post 1945 sense of invincibility met the realities of domestic pressure and unmatched strategy.  While traditional, or “orthodox”, historians such as aguentar Lewy have attributed defeat to political and strategic mismanagement in SaigonModern revisionist scholars—including Christian Appy and George Herring—emphasize the critical role of public perception and media scrutiny at the home front. The Vietnam War marked a turning point in U.S military history: for the first time, real time images of violence reached American living rooms, collapsing the distinction between combat zone and civilian space. Gallup polls recorded a 15% drop in support for the war in the weeks following the Tet Offensive. This unequalled visibility morphed war into a public spectacle and into a domestic crisis.In this scenario, the conflict was not lost due to American troops being outperformed, but rather because they failed to uphold moral or political legitimacy with their own population. Placing the war in the broader framework of 20th-century American interventionism, from Korea to Iraq, enables one to see Vietnam not as an anomaly but as a case example. This pattern is reflected in later actions, especially the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003. While the former was framed as a limited, multilateral response to Iraqi aggression, the latter evolved into a prolonged occupation justified by questionable intelligence and ideological reasons, including the strategic influence of pro-Israel neoconservatives in American foreign policy. Scholars like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that Zionist lobbying and U.S. support for Israeli security goals fostered a view of the Middle East that depicted the Iraqi regime as both attractive and inescapable. Vietnam thereby becomes the story held by the United States—a framework for understanding how America's wars, even when engaged with greater military power, can undermine their ideological foundations under global examination.  Ultimately, the Vietnam War was a multifaceted affair—welcoming double entendres in regard to its finale. In the final analysis, the United States lost not because of a battlefield defeat, but because of the political collapse and disillusionment at home. While guerilla tactics, flawed tactics and a resilient opponent contributed to its utter defeat, it was the erosion of domestic support, driven by media exposures,  mass protests, and political scandals—that ultimately made it implausible to sustain any war efforts. The Vietnam War reveleaded the limits of military power in the absence of political transparency and public consensus. In this sense, this war was not only a military conflict , but also a battle for the soul of American democracy—and it was lost in the hearts and minds of the American people.

By: Manuela Medeiros From the age of empires, when maps were redrawn over tea, to Silicon Valley’s era of megabytes: the currency of power has transformed. Military conquest is no longer the sole route to shaping international order. Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power —the ability to “get others to want what you want” through attraction rather than coercion, has become crucial for advancing political goals without paying the high price of war (Nye, 2017). This essay argues that the most influential states shape not only the world’s actions but its aspirations, using economic and cultural strategies, regardless of soft power’s limits and its interplay with hard power. Economic instruments shape political behaviour through dependency, incentives, and the architecture of trade. China’s 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), spanning over 150 countries and worth $1 trillion, offers infrastructure loans often tied to tacit political concessions, such as support for the “One China” policy (McBride, Berman and Chatzky, 2023). Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, leased to China for 99 years after loan default, gave Beijing a strategic Indian Ocean foothold, provoking countermeasures from India and the U.S. Similarly, the United States leveraged its dominance in global finance (BBC News, 2021). Sanctions excluding states like Iran, Russia, and North Korea from the SWIFT banking network aim to alter behaviour without military force. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, sanctions helped trigger a 50% collapse in the rouble, demonstrating how market access remains a potent bargaining chip (Sullivan, 2024). If economic tools open doors, cultural influence determines whether they stay open. Nations export language, media, and education to cultivate familiarity and goodwill. Hollywood, jazz, and hip-hop subtly project American ideals; France’s Alliance Française, Britain’s British Council, and Japan’s “Cool Japan” initiative extend cultural footprints(Cabinet Office, 2016). South Korea’s Hallyu  wave, backed by government funding, integrates pop culture into diplomacy, BTS speaking at the UN exemplifies the fusion of art and statecraft (UNICEF, 2020) (Martin Roll, 2021). This exports values into regions like Southeast Asia; bearing influence through culture rather than ammo. Fig 1. Japanese promotion of the "Cool Japan" initiative Education magnifies these effects. Scholarships and exchanges such as the Fulbright programs immerse future leaders in a country’s values and networks, creating long-term political returns (Anon, n.d.-a). Figures like former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan credited foreign education with shaping their diplomatic worldview, showing how such investments can yield influence decades later (Ethics and International Affairs, 2025). Yet, soft power rarely works alone. Economic dependency can breed resentment, as with African criticisms of Chinese “neo-colonial” projects (Suri, 2024). Cultural exports risk being dismissed as propaganda, while sanctions can harden defiance, post-2014 Russia deepened ties with China and the Global South, developing parallel financial systems. Soft power is also slow to act: in urgent crises like Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, deterrence still relies on hard power (Genini, 2025). History suggests soft power is most effective when underpinned by credible hard power. Britain’s 19th-century cultural reach and America’s post-1945 dominance both rested on military and economic primacy. Soft power is not a substitute but a complement, the persuasive voice gains force when backed by the capacity to act (Anon, n.d.-b). Yesterday’s influence marched with armies; today it travels through trade deals, cultural exchanges, and shared ideals. But credibility and trust remain the true borders of influence (Nye Jr., 2015). In an age where the battlefield is as much ideological as territorial, the most powerful nations are those that make others believe their future is safest in partnership. Soft power, therefore, is not merely an accessory, but hard power’s most enduring counterpart, the ability to win without fighting. Works cited: Anon, (n.d.). EDUCATION DIPLOMACY: actors, tools & processes in 2022 . [online] Available at:   https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/education-diplomacy/  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Anon, (n.d.). Soft Power diplomacy - Diplo . [online] Available at:   https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/soft-power-diplomacy/  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. BBC News, (2021). What is the ‘One China’ policy?. BBC News , [online] 6 Oct. Available at:   https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Cabinet Office, (2016). Cool Japan Strategy - Cabinet Office Home Page . [online] Cao.go.jp . Available at:   https://www.cao.go.jp/cool_japan/english/index-e.html  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Carrai, M., (2019). CHINA’S MALLEABLE SOVEREIGNTY ALONG THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: THE CASE OF THE 99-YEAR CHINESE LEASE OF HAMBANTOTA PORT . [online] Available at:   https://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/NYI401.pdf  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org , (2025). Kofi Annan and Global Leadership at the United Nations . [online] Available at:   https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/journal/kofi-annan-and-global-leadership-at-the-united-nations  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Genini, D., (2025). How the war in Ukraine has transformed the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook of European Law , [online] doi: 10.1093/yel/yeaf003. Jr, J.S.N., (2015). American Hegemony or American Primacy? | by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. [online] Project Syndicate. Available at:   https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-hegemony-military-superiority-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-03  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Martin Roll, (2021). Korean Wave (Hallyu) - Rise of Korea’s Cultural Economy & Pop Culture. [online] Martin Roll. Available at:   https://martinroll.com/resources/articles/asia/korean-wave-hallyu-the-rise-of-koreas-cultural-economy-pop-culture/  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. McBride, J., Berman, N. and Chatzky, A., (2023). China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at:   https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Nye, J., (2017). Soft power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept. Palgrave Communications , 3(17008), p.2. doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.8. Sullivan, A., (2024). Russia in panic as US sanctions trigger ruble collapse. [online] dw.com . Available at:   https://www.dw.com/en/russia-ruble-us-sanctions-war-in-ukraine-v1/a-70905425  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. Suri, R., (2024). China’s neocolonialism in Africa. [online] Globalorder. Available at:   https://www.globalorder.live/post/china-s-neocolonialism-in-africa  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025]. UNICEF, (2020). BTS heartfelt message to young people at UNGA. [online]   www.unicef.org . Available at:   https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/BTS-LoveMyself  [Accessed 12 Aug. 2025].

By: Tiger Shen In September 2025, Nepal witnessed massive Gen-Z led protests after the government banned 26+ social media apps. Witnessing blatant abuse of power and the government's corruption, the youth of the country had enough, and orchestrated numerous violent protests aimed to end corruption. From burning luxury Hilton Hotels, to burning the wife of a former prime minister on fire, it is evident that the Nepalese youth are fed up and demand an end to the vicious cycle of corruption. Response to the protests from authorities was brutal. Human Rights Watch documented that “police in Nepal used lethal force to suppress youth protests on September 8, 2025, kill[ing] at least 19 people and injur[ing] over 300” (Human Rights Watch). Witnesses described scenes where “Security forces fired directly at students. Several were injured and some were killed.” Sahana Vajracharya, a journalist present at the protests, reported seeing “a sea of protesters, many in school uniforms. Police used water cannons, tear gas, and fired live ammunition after people climbed on the wall outside parliament.” These facts were also confirmed by Reuters, which stated, “At least 19 people in two cities died on Monday in Nepal’s worst unrest in decades, authorities said, as police in the capital fired tear gas and rubber bullets at protesters trying to storm parliament” (“Nineteen Killed in Nepal in ‘Gen Z’ Protest Over Social Media Ban, Corruption”; Dodge). This, I would argue, only further enraged the Nepalese people. When people’s requests for basic rights are responded with bullets, it gets ugly — fast. Hence, the brutality of authorities only further fueled the bloody protests, as International standards were clearly violated by the Nepalese authorities. Human Rights Watch referenced the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force: “Firearms are not an appropriate tool for the policing of assemblies, and must never be used simply to disperse an assembly.… [A]ny use of firearms by law enforcement officials in the context of assemblies must be limited to targeted individuals in circumstances in which it is strictly necessary to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury” (Human Rights Watch). And as a response, the Nepalese protesters took to arms, determined to shed through blood if it meant spreading their message. Some carried rifles, many brandished a weapon, all for the sake of their voice being heard. Fig 1. An anti-government protester brandishes a rifle in Kathmandu, Nepal, on Tuesday, amid violent demonstrations triggered by the county's brief social media ban and complaints about government corruption. (Bikram Rai/Reuters) What truly distinguished these protests from uprisings of the past was how youth rage became a powerful unifying force. Protesters chanted “Long live Gen Z,” forming “a throbbing, collective voice that shook the heart of Kathmandu and brought the government down on its knees” (Pokharel). Demonstrators “came together under a loose ‘Gen Z’ umbrella, bridging boundaries of class, region, and political views as “hundreds of protesters” broke through barricades and entered parliament, proclaiming “Long live Gen Z Unity” (Pokharel). As one participant recounted, “When they tried to silence us by shutting down our digital civic space, we had no choice but to come to the streets. I travelled over 400 km… to participate in the movement” (Pokharel). Even prominent leaders and activists emphasized the collective nature of the protest, with Gen Z activist Raksha Bam stating that “We are moving forward within the framework of the constitution,” (Pokharel). This just goes to demonstrate that the Nepalese protest was beyond another protest — the movement united youth from divergent backgrounds unlike any other. Yet, the citizens of Nepal have not abandoned hope. A garment worker, quoted by Reuters, expressed the core hope of many: “I yearn for a future devoid of corruption... I hope for a better tomorrow for those who have left.” (“Nineteen Killed in Nepal in ‘Gen Z’ Protest Over Social Media Ban, Corruption”). Overall, the Nepalese Gen Z protests of 2025 not only demonstrate frustration built up by decades of lies and corruption, it also demonstrate the power of the youth and the strength of unity. It is to this extent that their sacrifice and resilience sent a clear message: radical change comes from radical actions. Works Cited:  Human Rights Watch. “Nepal: Police Fire on ‘Gen Z’ Protest.” Human Rights Watch, 9 Sept. 2025, www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/09/nepal-police-fire-on-gen-z-protest .   “2025 Nepalese Gen Z Protests | Background, Social Media Ban, & Political Breakdown.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11 Sept. 2025, www.britannica.com/event/2025-Nepalese-Gen-Z-Protests .   “Nineteen Killed in Nepal in ‘Gen Z’ Protest Over Social Media Ban, Corruption.” Reuters, 8 Sept. 2025, www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/nineteen-killed-nepal-gen-z-protest-over-social-media-ban-corruption-2025-09-08/ .   Dodge, Cara. “U.S. Issues Nepal Warning as Gen Z Revolts.” Newsweek, 12 Sept. 2025, www.newsweek.com/us-nepal-travel-warning-protests-2128868 .   “What’s behind the Protests Rocking Nepal? | CBC News.” CBCnews, CBC/Radio Canada, 9 Sept. 2025, www.cbc.ca/news/world/protests-nepal-1.7629370 .   Pokharel, Gaurav. “The rage and rampage: Why are Nepal's youth angry?” The Indian Express, 13 Sept. 2025.  https://indianexpress.com/article/long-reads/nepal-gen-z-protest-corruption-political-order-10246974/ “What we know about Nepal anti-corruption protests as PM resigns.” BBC News, 9 Sept. 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crkj0lzlr3ro

On August 31 and September 1, Tianjin was the backdrop of the 25th annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The summit conveyed a clear message of reshaping the global framework of governance. If we had not felt the world order of the last few decades shift yet, we are now. China hosted the summit and has implicitly positioned itself as the leader in presenting an alternative to the American-led world order. This world order is shaped by security alliances, great U.S. influence in the financial and political world and sovereignty that is sometimes overridden by external powers. It favors American interests and therefore has more negotiating power, military capabilities and a network of allies that work to contribute to those interests. China has seen an opportunity for it to offer an alternative to this global order, one led, financed and influenced by China. In the days following the SCO summit, coverage has partly been leaning towards skepticism about the potential of such a world order even being possible to realise. This skepticism is not entirely misplaced. The SCO consists of nine, mostly central Asian, states and votes by consensus. These two factors alone make it a less threatening entity to NATO and the EU. In addition, SCO does not mandate a commitment to mutual assistance. This makes it difficult to take action. The organization therefore holds most value as a forum for debates about its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). Herein the main security threats the organization faces are terrorism, separatism and extremism.  While China is among the world's greatest economies and has extensive political power, it is frequently confronted with domestic and international trouble that can be categorized as one of the three threats SCO as a whole focuses on. This has in turn led to increased centralization of authority by the Chinese government domestically and has resulted in repression of ethnic minorities, critics and human rights organizations.  For China, hosting the summit is not just symbolically conveying a message, the hosting city Tianjin was the scene where several unequal treaties were signed in 1858.  Two days after the summit, the symbolism continued as the military parade was held on September 3. Marking the 80th anniversary of China’s Victory Day, it did not only celebrate the end of the Sino-Japanese war but it also highlighted China’s military capabilities. The first week of September 2025 was representative of changing attitudes in geopolitics. It showed that India, China and Russia though differing in interests were showing unity in favor of a multipolar world order.  Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pictured in China China presents its ambitions of working towards a multipolarity as an alternative to the world order of the past few decades. It is clear this multipolarity is to take up its place in the current world order that is American-led. This also adds to the significance of this year’s SCO summit. The geopolitical climate is always a web of tensions but now with even more strained relations as a result of the United States’ current political course. This makes the message this summit sent out all the more clearer: the SCO is a platform through which China aims to take a “stance against hegemonism”. The presentation of a united front by the leaders of 26,3% of the world's population in their advocacy for a changed world order offers an alternative to American hegemony. The show of unity at the summit can also be read as an answer to American pressure urging China and India to reduce their imports of Russian oil and gas. China has had multiple initiatives that aim to reach the goal of a multipolar world order. Its Global Governance Initiative (GGI) urges for “development and reform of the global governance system”.  These are mainly dominated by the U.S. and its allied states. Through BRICS it also advocated for a New Development Bank, which could effectively serve as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank. These latter two institutions have for long been criticized to be disproportionately influenced by the great share of American and European votes. Another channel through which China has emphasized these ambitions is the Belt and Road Initiative. It has offered financial, logistical and political infrastructures in nearly every continent. It is clear that China has been building towards a new and China-oriented world order.  Russia has been fighting pressures on all sides. Its invasion of Ukraine has cost it hundreds of billions in USD and over 250.000 soldiers.  War fatigue seems to catch up with Russia more than it is willing to admit. In addition, Russia is also suffering from Ukrainian attacks on energy facilities. On its other borders it faced pressures, too. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), aimed at politico-military cooperation and national and collective security failed in its raison d’etre. The organization lost much of its credibility during Azerbaijan’s offensive on Armenia in 2023. Russia’s inaction showed the CSTO was not an effort worth pursuing for Putin. Russia is using the SCO summit as an opportunity to present itself towards Europe and America with a message; it is not alone on the world stage despite sanctions and condemnations. This message does not translate to the battlefield as Russian drones’ presence on Polish territory on September 10 Poland triggered NATO’s article 4. In this light it becomes increasingly evident, Russia is in desperate need of allies as Europe is preparing for military impact being felt on its eastern flank.  Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands at 2025's Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. India was the third key player at this year’s summit. The presence of Prime Minister Modi highlighted changing attitudes in relations between China and India. For the first time in seven years the Indian head of state made a visit to China. Sino-Indian relations have been experiencing pressure for years now, in part due to contrasting opinions on a range of topics from the One-China Policy to the debate on Tibetan statehood and Sino-Pakistani relations. Against the backdrop of U.S. imposed tariffs, India had used the summit as an opportunity to show it will be preserving its ambiguous position between the United States and China. India has been able to uniquely position itself as a friend to all, becoming a counterweight to China’s influence in Asia. India’s participation is also valuable to Russia as it allows for more counterweight to China within the SCO and thus multipolarity. China can relate to the pressure felt by India as a result of tariffs, but counters it by affirming its ambitions of reshaping the structures that allow for this pressure. The tariffs have urged the three states to move closer to one another. Even if SCO, BRICS or the Belt and Road Initiative have not caused major international diversion from an American-led world order, it is clear that these states desire and work towards it. Therefore the possible consequences of its success should be enough for the United States and its allies to seriously reconsider its position in the global order and how it may change in the near future.  Sources: Aljazeera, ’China, Russia pledge new global order at Shanghai Cooperation summit’, 2 September 2025.  Bao, Anniek, ‘SCO summit 2025: Key takeaways from Beijing’s push to reshape global order’, September 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/02/sco-summit-2025-key-takeaways.html Bardhann, Ashok, ‘Decoding the SCO Summit: The Changing World Order Gathers Momentum’, 10 September 2025.  G. Jones, Seth and McCabe, Riley, ‘Russia’s Battlefield Woes in Ukraine’, 3 June 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2025, events of 2004’, January 2025. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/china Kent, Lauren, ‘After Russian drones were downed in Poland, what does triggering NATO Article 4 mean?’, 11 September 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/11/europe/nato-article-four-poland-drones-intl J. Shatz, Howard and Reach, Clint, The Cost of the Ukraine War for Russia’’, 18 December 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2421-1.html Jaura, Ramesh, ‘SCO Summit 2025: Eurasia’s Laboratory Of Contradictions – Analysis’,  9 September 2025. https://www.eurasiareview.com/09092025-sco-summit-2025-eurasias-laboratory-of-contradictions-analysis/   Levin, Henrietta, China Showcases Global Ambitions at Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit’’, 3 September  2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-showcases-global-ambitions-shanghai-cooperation-organization-summit Saini, Ayushi, ‘India in SCO: A part of Russia’s Greater Eurasian dream?’ 11 July 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-in-sco-a-part-of-russia-s-greater-eurasian-dream ? Tunagur, Enes, ‘Oil rises as investors assess attacks on Russian energy facilities’, 15 September 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-rises-investors-assess-attacks-russian-energy-facilities-2025-09-15/ Verberg, Gabi, ‘Grote veiligheidstop in China: waarschijnlijk veel symboliek, weinig plannen’, 30 August 2025. https://nos.nl/artikel/2580473-grote-veiligheidstop-in-china-waarschijnlijk-veel-symboliek-weinig-plannen Visual sources: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-62886142 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3300605/china-said-be-planning-military-parade-wwii-anniversary-putin-attend https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/517287/India-s-Modi-to-meet-Xi-and-Putin-on-first-China-trip-in-seven

Teenagers are no longer passive spectators of global politics. With smartphones in hand, fluency in digital platforms, and a strong presence in cultural spaces, they have become visible actors of international influence. Online campaigns, fandom mobilization, and cultural narratives have pressured governments, shaped public debates, and even reached international organizations. This new form of engagement reflects a kind of teenage soft power—a political force rooted in culture, visibility, and connectivity rather than traditional markers of power. By: Anna Campelo Digital Activism as a Diplomatic Force Digital activism takes many forms: online protests, hashtag campaigns, viral videos, petitions, and networked communities working around political or humanitarian causes. Once dismissed as “slacktivism,” these practices now influence public opinion, corporate decisions, and even the priorities of states in international negotiations. A brief timeline highlights how this influence has grown. In 2010–2011, the Arab Spring revealed how young activists could use social media to organize protests that toppled regimes and altered regional diplomacy across North Africa and the Middle East. In 2012, the viral video Kony 2012, created by young filmmakers, drew unprecedented global attention to war crimes in Uganda and pressured governments into action—one of the first times virality shaped international political debate. In 2014, students in Hong Kong led the Umbrella Movement, using encrypted apps and live streams to turn a local protest into a global media event. By 2018, U.S. teenagers from Parkland High School organized March for Our Lives after a mass shooting, creating one of the largest youth-led protests since the Vietnam War era and drawing attention to gun violence worldwide. In 2020, young Nigerians launched #EndSARS, a digital campaign against police brutality that reverberated across continents, sparking solidarity actions from London to New York. Around the same time, teenagers in Belarus and Myanmar relied on memes, VPNs, and digital art to bypass censorship and broadcast their democratic struggles internationally. Youth-led demonstration during the March for Our Lives in Los Angeles, 2018, where students demanded stricter gun control laws and highlighted the role of young voices in shaping national debates. From the Arab Spring to #EndSARS, youth-led activism has moved from sporadic viral moments to a permanent presence in global politics, where young people shape narratives that governments and diplomats are compelled to respond to. Youth as Architects of New Diplomatic Narratives What distinguishes teenagers in international activism is their ability to link personal identity with global causes. Climate action illustrates this well. Greta Thunberg’s journey from solitary protest in Sweden to speaking at the UN General Assembly shows how a youth voice can reframe international negotiations. The Fridays for Future network, largely coordinated online, pressured governments worldwide and introduced the concept of intergenerational justice into the language of climate diplomacy. Other causes followed a similar path. The spread of #MeToo empowered young women across the world to denounce gender-based violence, influencing not only local debates but also UN resolutions. Campaigns for internet freedom and net neutrality, also driven by young activists, reframed digital access as a human rights issue, demanding recognition from international organizations. Youth activism operates differently from traditional diplomacy. Where states negotiate slowly and formally, youth movements act quickly, inclusively, and often disruptively. By shaping global conversations online, young activists indirectly set the agenda for international politics. This shift reflects a form of “networked diplomacy,” in which digital publics operate as watchdogs, influencers, and sometimes rivals to state legitimacy. Pop Culture as a Catalyst for Political Engagement The influence of youth on diplomacy is not limited to organized protests. It is also powered by the cultural tools they use. Pop culture functions as both a language and a platform for activism, making complex issues accessible and emotionally resonant. By weaving politics into the narratives of music, cinema, games, and sports, young people bring activism into everyday life and expand its reach. During the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, music fandoms showed how cultural communities could become engines of political action. Beyoncé’s BeyHive amplified her calls for justice, spreading petitions, voter registration drives, and fundraising campaigns alongside her foundation BeyGOOD’s donations to organizations such as the NAACP. Rihanna’s Navy mobilized online by sharing resources and highlighting her decision to suspend commercial activity in solidarity, while Ariana Grande’s fans rallied around bail funds after she joined street demonstrations. K-pop fandoms, like BTS’s ARMY, also played a supportive role by raising millions for racial justice groups, hijacking extremist hashtags to disrupt hate speech, and disrupting political rallies. All of these fan bases and many others contributed by pressuring local politicians and encouraging voter registration. Together, these movements reveal how fan communities redirected their skills from entertainment to activism, making pop culture a powerful tool for youth mobilization. Cinema has carried similar weight. The global success of Black Panther (2018) sparked debates about representation, African identity, and diaspora politics, which resonated in diplomatic and cultural forums. The Hunger Games films left an equally political legacy: the three-finger salute adopted by characters was taken up by young protesters in Thailand and Myanmar, transforming a Hollywood gesture into a real-world symbol of resistance. Comics and superheroes contribute another symbolic language. Narratives of Marvel and DC, centered on justice, resistance, and diversity, circulate widely on social media. Young activists reinterpret these stories to frame their struggles, giving protests visual repertoires that resonate globally. Gaming and esports have also entered the political arena. Platforms such as Twitch and Discord are used for fundraising and awareness campaigns, while the industry itself has become a battleground. In 2019, when an esports player voiced support for Hong Kong’s protests, the corporate censorship that followed triggered international debates on freedom of expression and the reach of Chinese influence in global industries. Sports culture adds to this dynamic. European football ultras have long mobilized against racism and authoritarianism, while during the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, youth-led campaigns highlighted migrant worker exploitation and LGBTQ+ repression. These actions ensured that global audiences and international institutions could not ignore the political context surrounding the event. Taken together, these examples show how pop culture is not peripheral but central to youth activism. It translates political struggles into familiar stories, songs, or symbols, helping movements grow across borders and compelling governments and organizations to pay attention. Nepal’s Gen Z Uprising: A Digital Rebellion for Democracy In September 2025, Nepal witnessed a significant youth-led movement demonstrating the growing influence of teenage soft power and digital activism. Triggered by a government-imposed ban on 26 major social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, the protests were primarily organized by Generation Z activists. Utilizing encrypted platforms like Discord and Instagram, they mobilized under hashtags such as #NepoKids and #SaveOurDemocracy, channeling their frustrations over corruption and political elitism into a nationwide uprising. The demonstrations escalated into violent clashes, resulting in at least 51 deaths and over 1,300 injuries. Government buildings were set ablaze, and the Prime Minister resigned in the face of mounting pressure. In response, the government lifted the social media ban and appointed Sushila Karki, Nepal’s first female Prime Minister, as an interim leader. Elections were scheduled for March 2026. This uprising highlights how young people in Nepal are exercising soft power through digital platforms, cultural expression, and organized mobilization. By turning social media into both a space for protest and a tool for global visibility, teenagers are shaping political outcomes and redefining how activism can influence governance in the digital age. In light of this, it’s clear that teenagers now have a level of influence in international politics that would have been unimaginable a generation ago. Their digital skills and cultural creativity allow them to pressure institutions, shape debates, and even change the way diplomacy is done. Today, international politics doesn’t happen only in negotiation rooms; it also unfolds on social media, streaming platforms, and cultural spaces where young people connect. Their soft power comes from creativity, culture, and the networks they build. How governments and organizations respond to these voices, whether by engaging seriously or just using them for show, will shape the future of diplomacy. 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